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Abstract
Statistical inference using social sensors is an area that has witnessed remark-
able progress in the last decade. It is relevant in a variety of applications includ-
ing localizing events for targeted advertising, marketing, localization of natural
disasters and predicting sentiment of investors in financial markets. This chap-
ter presents a tutorial description of four important aspects of sensing-based in-
formation diffusion in social networks from a communications/signal processing
perspective. First, diffusion models for information exchange in large scale social
networks together with social sensing via social media networks such as Twitter is
considered. Second, Bayesian social learning models and risk averse social learn-
ing is considered with applications in finance and online reputation systems. Third,
the principle of revealed preferences arising in micro-economics theory is used to
parse datasets to determine if social sensors are utility maximizers and then deter-
mine their utility functions. Finally, the interaction of social sensors with YouTube
channel owners is studied using time series analysis methods. All four topics are
explained in the context of actual experimental datasets from health networks, so-
cial media and psychological experiments. Also, algorithms are given that exploit
the above models to infer underlying events based on social sensing. The overview,
insights, models and algorithms presented in this chapter stem from recent devel-
opments in network science, economics and signal processing. At a deeper level,
this chapter considers mean field dynamics of networks, risk averse Bayesian so-
cial learning filtering and quickest change detection, data incest in decision making
over a directed acyclic graph of social sensors, inverse optimization problems for
utility function estimation (revealed preferences) and statistical modeling of inter-
acting social sensors in YouTube social networks.
Keywords. diffusion, Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS model), random graphs,
mean field dynamics, social sampling, social learning, risk averse social learning filter,
conditional value at risk, reputation systems, Afriat’s theorem, detecting utility maxi-
mizers, revealed preferences, potential games, Granger causality, YouTube
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Humans can be viewed as social sensors that interact over a social network to provide
information about their environment. Examples of information produced by such social
sensors include Twitter posts, Facebook status updates, and ratings on online reputa-
tion systems like Yelp and Tripadvisor. Social sensors go beyond physical sensors –
for example, user opinions/ratings (such as the quality of a restaurant) are available on
Tripadvisor but are difficult to measure via physical sensors. Similarly, future situa-
tions revealed by the Facebook status of a user are impossible to predict using physical
sensors [161].
Statistical inference using social sensors is an area that has witnessed remarkable
progress in the last decade. It is relevant in a variety of applications including localizing
special events for targeted advertising [119, 42], marketing [172, 122], localization of
natural disasters [162], and predicting sentiment of investors in financial markets [27,
150]. For example, [15] reports sthat models built from the rate of tweets for particular
products can outperform market-based predictors.
1.1 Context: Why social sensors?
Social sensors present unique challenges from a statistical estimation point of view.
First, social sensors interact with and influence other social sensors. For example,
ratings posted on online reputation systems strongly influence the behavior of individ-
uals.1 Such interacting sensing can result in non-standard information patterns due to
correlations introduced by the structure of the underlying social network. Thus cer-
tain events “go viral" [122, 70]. Second, due to privacy concerns and time-constraints,
social sensors typically do not reveal raw observations of the underlying state of na-
ture. Instead, they reveal their decisions (ratings, recommendations, votes) which can
be viewed as a low resolution (quantized) function of their raw measurements and in-
teractions with other social sensors. This can result in misinformation propagation,
herding and information cascades. Third, the response of a social sensors may not be
consistent with that of an utility maximizer; social sensors are typically risk averse.
Social sensors are enabled by technological networks. Indeed, social media sites
that support interpersonal communication and collaboration using Internet-based social
network platforms, are growing rapidly. McKinsey estimates that the economic impact
of social media on business is potentially greater than $1 trillion since social media
facilitates efficient communication and collaboration within and across organizations.
1.2 Main Results and Organization
There is strong motivation to construct models that facilitate understanding the dynam-
ics of information flow in social networks. This chapter presents a tutorial descrip-
tion of four mportant aspects of sensing-based information diffusion in social networks
from a signal processing perspective:
1It is reported in [92] that 81% of hotel managers regularly check Tripadvisor reviews. [131] reports that
a one-star increase in the Yelp rating maps to 5-9 % revenue increase.
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1.2.1 Information Diffusion in Large Scale Social Networks
The first topic considered in this chapter (Sec.2) is diffusion of information in social
networks comprised of a population of interacting social sensors. The states of sen-
sors evolve over time as a probabilistic function of the states of their neighbors and an
underlying target process. Several recent papers investigate such information diffusion
in real-world social networks. Motivated by marketing applications, [167] studies dif-
fusion (contagion) behavior in Facebook. Using data from 260,000 Facebook pages
(which advertise products, services and celebrities), [167] analyzes information diffu-
sion. In [159], the spread of hashtags on Twitter is studied. There is a wide range of
social phenomena such as diffusion of technological innovations, sentiment, cultural
fads, and economic conventions [36, 130] where individual decisions are influenced by
the decisions of others.
We consider the so called Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model [151] for
information diffusion in a social network. It is shown for social networks comprised of
a large number of agents how the dynamics of degree distribution can be approximated
by the mean field dynamics. Mean field dynamics have been studied in [21] and applied
to social networks in [130] and leads to a tractable model for the dynamics social
sensors.
We demonstrate using influenza datasets from the U.S Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) how Twitter can be used as a real time social sensor for track-
ing the spread of influenza. That is, a health network (namely, Influenza-like Illness
Surveillance Network (ILInet)) is sensed by a real time microblogging social media
network (namely, Twitter).
We also review two recent methods for sampling social networks, namely, social
sampling and respondent-driven sampling. Respondent-driven sampling is now used
by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as part of the National
HIV Behavioral Surveillance System in health networks.
1.2.2 Bayesian Social Learning in Online Reputation Systems
The second topic of this chapter (Sec.3) considers online reputation systems where in-
dividuals make recommendations based on their private observations and recommen-
dations of friends. Such interaction of individuals and their social influence is modelled
as Bayesian social learning [18, 25, 36] on a directed acyclic graph. We consider two
important classes of such problems; risk averse social learning in financial systems,
and data incest in reputation systems. The risk averse social learning and associated
quickest change detection is important in detecting market shocks in high frequency
trading. Data incest (misinformation propagation) arises as a result of correlations in
recommendations due to the intersection of multiple paths in the information exchange
graph. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given on the structure of information
exchange graph to mitigate data incest. Experimental results on human subjects are
presented to illustrate the effect of social influence and data incest on decision making.
The setup differs from classical signal processing where sensors use noisy observa-
tions to compute estimates - in social learning agents use noisy observations together
with decisions made by previous agents, to estimate the underlying state of nature.
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Social learning has been used widely in economics, marketing, political science and
sociology to model the behavior of financial markets, crowds, social groups and so-
cial networks; see [18, 25, 2, 36, 127, 1] and numerous references therein. Related
models have been studied in the context of sequential decision making in information
theory [45, 84] and statistical signal processing [37, 112] in the electrical engineering
literature. Social learning can result in unusual behavior such as herding [25] where
agents eventually choosing the same action irrespective of their private observations.
As a result, the actions contain no information about the private observations and so
the Bayesian estimate of the underlying random variable freezes. Such behavior can
be undesirable, particularly if individuals herd and make incorrect decisions.
1.2.3 Revealed Preferences and Detection of Utility Maximizers
The third topic considered in this chapter (Sec.4) is the principle of revealed prefer-
ences arising in microeconomics. It is used as a constructive test to determine: Are
social sensors utility optimizers in their response to external influence? The key ques-
tion considered is as follows: Given a time-series of dataD = {(pt, xt), t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }}
where pt ∈ Rm denotes the external influence, xt denotes the response of an agent, is it
possible to detect if the agent is a utility maximizer?
These issues are fundamentally different to the model-centric theme used in the
signal processing literature where one postulates an objective function (typically con-
vex) and then proposes optimization algorithms. In contrast the revealed preference
approach is data centric - given a dataset, we wish to determine if is consistent with
utility maximization.
We present a remarkable result called Afriat’s theorem [7, 175] which provides a
necessary and sufficient condition for a finite datasetD to have originated from a utility
maximizer. Also a multi-agent version of Afriat’s theorem is presented to determine if
the dataset generated by multiple agents is consistent with playing from the equilibrium
of a potential game.
Unlike model centric applications of game theory in signal processing, the revealed
preferences approach is data centric: 1) Given a time series dataset of probe and re-
sponse signals, how can one detect if the response signals are consistent with a Nash
equilibrium generated by players in a concave potential game? 2) If consistent with a
concave potential game, how can the utility function of the players be estimated?
We present three datasets involving social sensors to illustrate Afriat’s theorem of
revealed preferences. These datasets are: (i) an auction conducted by undergraduate
students at Princeton University, (ii) aggregate power consumption in the electricity
market of Ontario province and (iii) Twitter dataset for specific hashtags.
Varian has written several influential papers on Afriat’s theorem in the economics
literature. These include measuring the welfare effect of price discrimination [177],
analysing the relationship between prices of broadband Internet access and time of use
service [180], and ad auctions for advertisement position placement on page search
results from Google [180, 179]. Despite widespread use in economics, revealed pref-
erence theory is relatively unknown in the electrical engineering literature.
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1.2.4 Social Interaction of YouTube Consumers
The fourth topic considered in this chapter (Sec.5) is the engagement dynamics of
social sensors to online video content. Specifically, we consider how users interact
with video content created on the YouTube social network. YouTube is the largest
user-driven video content provider in the world and has become a major platform for
disseminating multimedia information. YouTube contains over 1 billion users who
collectively watch millions of hours of YouTube videos and generate billions of views
every day (e.g. 150 years of video are watched every day). Additionally, users upload
over 300 hours of video content every minute. YouTube generates billions in revenue
through advertising and also shares the revenue with the popular users that upload
videos through the Partner program. YouTube is clearly a social media site, however
is YouTube also a social networking site? In classical online social networks the in-
teraction is directly between users–that is, user-user interactions. However YouTube is
unique in that the interaction between users includes video content–that is, the interac-
tion follows users-content-users. In fact the interaction between users is incentivized
using the posted videos. In this way it is not merely the interest preferences between
users that promote user-user interaction, but also the content of the videos that governs
the social interactions between users.
Using real-world data consisting of over 6 million videos spread over 25 thousand
channels, we empirically examine the sensitivity of YouTube meta-level features on the
engagement dynamics of users in YouTube. Insight into the dynamics of social sensors
in YouTube can be used to predict how users will interact with posted video content.
These results are important for designing methods for optimizing user engagement and
for improving the efficiency of content distribution networks [87, 164, 88]. Estimat-
ing the popularity of YouTube videos based on meta-level features is a challenging
problem given the diversity of users and content providers. Time-series methods for
modeling YouTube the engagement dynamics of videos over time include ARMA time
series models [75], multivariate linear regression models [153], and Gompertz mod-
els [156, 157]. These methods do not utilize any of the meta-level features of the
YouTube video to estimate the users engagement dynamics. In [187] a bag-of-words
Bernoulli Naive Bayes classifier is applied to perform a binary classification (popu-
lar/unpopular) of YouTube videos based on the title alone. The classifier was able to
achieve a classification accuracy of 66%. In [87] visual perception and extreme learn-
ing machines were applied to the meta-level features of videos and found to be able
to accurately estimate the (popular/unpopular) videos with an accuracy of 80%. It was
determined that the main meta-level features that impact video engagement include:
first day view count , number of subscribers, and contrast of the video thumbnail.
The above methods focus on how to estimate user engagement to specific videos;
however, they do not consider the social learning dynamics that are present between
users and channel owners. The key topics focused on in Sec.5 are: (i) how user en-
gagement is affected by changes in meta-level (title, thumbnail, tag) features of the
videos, (ii) the causal relationship between channel subscribers and user engagement,
(iii) the engagement dynamics of videos over time with exogenous social media events,
and (iv) the engagement of users to videos in a channel’s video playlist. The insight
provided can be used by channel owners to design policies for maximizing user en-
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gagement by adjusting video meta-level features, promoting on external social media
venues, and periodically adjusting the uploading schedule of videos.
1.3 Perspective
The unifying theme that underpins the four topics in this chapter stems from statistical
signal processing and controlled sensing. These are used to predict global behavior
given local behavior: individual social sensors interact with other sensors and we are
interested in understanding the behavior of the entire network. Information diffusion,
social learning and revealed preferences are important issues for social sensors. We
treat these issues in a highly stylized manner so as to provide easy accessibility to a
signal processing audience. The underlying tools used in this chapter are widely used
in signal processing, economics and network science.
Let us briefly discuss how the four themes of this chapter interact; these four themes
are depicted in Fig.1.
Network Dif-
fusion Models
User Interaction
in YouTube
Bayesian Social
Learning Models
Revealed
Preferences
Figure 1: Four themes considered in this chapter
The network diffusion models are non-Bayesian and describe the behavior of large
numbers of social sensors. The mean field dynamics model for the diffusion of informa-
tion has the form of an averaged stochastic approximation algorithm (which is widely
used in adaptive filtering). Note however, here that the stochastic approximation type
equation is a generative model, and not an algorithm.
The Bayesian social learning models in contrast describe highly stylized individual
behavior of social sensors. At this level, it is important to model risk-averse human
decision making and the Bayesian social learning model serves as a useful generative
model.
Underpinning both the network diffusion and Bayesian social learning models, are
utility (cost) functions which the social sensors optimize in order to make decisions.
The natural question is: Given real world data, is the behavior of agents consistent with
optimizing a utility function? If yes, can the utility function be estimated? Revealed
preferences yield a useful set of algorithms that can answer both these questions. More
generally, it can be used to detect play from the Nash equilibrium of a potential game.
Put simply, revealed preferences provide the data-driven justification for the utility
function models.
Finally, the detailed analysis of the YouTube data provides for an interesting real
world study of how social sensors interact. It is important to note that while YouTube
is clearly a social media site, it is also a social networking site. Classical online so-
cial networks (OSNs) are dominated by user-user interactions. However YouTube is
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unique in that the interaction between users includes video content?that is, the interac-
tion follows users-content-users. The interaction between users in the YouTube social
network is incentivized using the posted videos. In addition to the social incentives,
YouTube also gives monetary incentives to promote users increasing their popularity.
As more users view and interact with a users video or channel, YouTube will pay the
user proportional to the advertisement exposure on the users channel. Therefore, users
not only maximize exposure to increase their social popularity, but also for monetary
gain which introduce unique dynamics in the formation of edges in the YouTube social
network.
Books and Tutorials
The literature in social learning, information diffusion and revealed preferences is
extensive. In each of the following sections, we provide a brief review of relevant
works. Seminal books in social networks, social learning and network science include
[181, 93, 36, 57]. There is a growing literature dealing with the interplay of techno-
logical and social networks [40]. Social networks overlaid on technological networks
account for a significant fraction of Internet use. As discussed in [40], three key aspects
that cut across social and technological networks are the emergence of global coordina-
tion through local actions, resource sharing models and the wisdom of crowds. These
themes are addressed in the current chapter in the context of social learning, diffusion
and revealed preferences. Other tutorials include [113, 109].
2 Information Diffusion in Large Scale Social Networks
This section addresses the first topic of the chapter, namely, information diffusion mod-
els and their mean field dynamics in social networks. The setting is as follows: The
states of individual nodes in the social network evolve over time as a probabilistic func-
tion of the states of their neighbors and an underlying target process (state of nature).
The underlying target process can be viewed as the market conditions or competing
technologies that evolve with time and affect the information diffusion. The nodes in
the social network are sampled randomly to determine their state. As the adoption of
the new technology diffuses through the network, its effect is observed via sentiments
(such as tweets) of these selected members of the population. These selected nodes
act as social sensors. In signal processing terms, the underlying target process can be
viewed as a signal, and the social network can be viewed as a sensor. The key dif-
ference compared to classical sensing is that the sensor now is a social network with
diffusion dynamics and noisy measurements (due to sampling nodes).
As described in Sec.1, a wide range of social phenomena such as diffusion of tech-
nological innovations, cultural fads, ideas, behaviors, trends and economic conven-
tions [72, 139, 41, 36] can be modelled by diffusion in social networks. Another im-
portant application is sentiment analysis (opinion mining) where the spread of opinions
amongst people is monitored via social media.
Motivated by the above setting, this section proceeds as follows:
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Influenza Health Network
Twitter (Social Sensor)
#
tw
ee
ts
τ k
Days
Infected Nodes
(a) Dynamics of Health Net-
work impact the # of tweets.
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
Diffusion Model
Time-series model for tweets
Number of Infected Nodes
(b) Model for the number of
tweets resulting from the In-
fluenza Health Network.
Figure 2: Dynamics of Health Network are modelled using the SIS model and a Linear
and Nonlinear Autoregressive with Exogenous input time series models, refer to Sec.2
for details.
1. We describe the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model for diffusion of
information in social networks which has been extensively studied in [93, 129,
130, 151, 181].
2. Next, it is shown how the dynamics of the infected degree distribution of the
social network can be approximated by the mean field dynamics. The mean field
dynamics state that as the number of agents in the social network goes to infinity,
the dynamics of the infected degree distribution converges to that of an ordinary
differential (or difference) equation. Such averaging theory results are widely
used to analyze adaptive filters. For social networks, they yield a useful tractable
model for the diffusion dynamics.
3. We illustrate the diffusion model by using data sets from 3 related social net-
works to track the spread of influenza during the period September 1 to Decem-
ber 31, 2009. The friendship network of 744 undergraduate students at Harvard
college is used together with the U.S. outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveil-
lance Network (ILInet) to monitor the spread of influenza. Then it is shown
that Twitter posts related to influenza during this period are correlated with the
spread of influenza. Thus in this example, influenza diffuses in a human health
network (Harvard friendship network at a local level and ILInet at a global level)
and Twitter is used as a social sensor to monitor the spread of the influenza.
4. Finally, this section also describes how social networks can be sampled. We re-
view two recent methods for sampling social networks, namely, social sampling
and respondent-driven sampling; the latter being used in health networks.
The aim is to estimate the underlying target state that is being sensed by the social
network and also and the state probabilities of the nodes by sampling measurements
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at nodes in the social network. In a Bayesian estimation context, this is equivalent
to a filtering problem involving estimation of the state of a prohibitively large scale
Markov chain in noise. The mean field dynamics yields a tractable approximation with
provable bounds for the information diffusion. Such mean field dynamics have been
studied in [21] and applied to social networks in [129, 130, 181]. For an excellent recent
exposition of interacting particle systems comprising of agents each with a finite state
space, see [9], where the more apt term “Finite Markov Information Exchange (FMIE)
process” is used.
Regarding real datasets, in addition to the case study presented below, for other
examples of diffusion datasets and their analysis see [167, 159]. A repository of social
network datasets can be obtained at [121].
2.1 Social Network Model
A social network is modelled as a graph with N vertices:
G = (V, E), where V = {1, 2, . . . ,N}, and E ⊆ V × V. (1)
Here, V denotes the finite set of vertices, and E denotes the set of edges. In social
networks, it is customary to use the terminology network, nodes and links for graph,
vertices and edges, respectively.
We use the notation (m, n) to refer to a link between node m and n. The network
may be undirected in which case (m, n) ∈ E implies (n,m) ∈ E. In undirected graphs,
to simplify notation, we use the notation m, n to denote the undirected link between
node n and m. If the graph is directed, then (m, n) ∈ E does not imply that (n,m) ∈ E.
We will assume that self loops (reflexive links) of the form i, i are excluded from E.
An important parameter of a social network G = (V, E) is the connectivity of its
nodes. LetN (m) and D(m) denote the neighbourhood set and degree (or connectivity) of
a node m ∈ V , respectively. That is, with | · | denoting cardinality,
N (m) = {n ∈ V : m, n ∈ E}, D(m) = ∣∣∣N (m)∣∣∣. (2)
For convenience, we assume that the maximum degree of the network is uniformly
bounded by some fixed integer D¯.
Let N(d) denote the number of nodes with degree d, and let the degree distribution
P(d) specify the fraction of nodes with degree d. That is, for d = 0, 1, . . . , D¯,
N(d) =
∑
m∈V
I
{
D(m) = d
}
, P(d) =
N(d)
N
.
Here, I {·} denotes the indicator function. Note that ∑d P(d) = 1. The degree distri-
bution can be viewed as the probability that a node selected randomly with uniform
distribution on V has a connectivity d.
Random graphs generated to have a degree distribution P that is Poisson were for-
mulated by Erdös and Renyi [59]. Several recent works show that large scale social
networks are characterized by connectivity distributions that are different to Poisson
distributions. For example, the internet, www have a power law connectivity distri-
bution P(d) ∝ d−γ, where γ ranges between 2 and 3. Such scale free networks are
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studied in [19]. In the rest of this chapter, we assume that the degree distribution of
the social network is arbitrary but known—allowing an arbitrary degree distribution
facilities modelling complex networks.
Let k = 0, 1, . . . denote discrete time. Assume the target process s is a finite state
Markov chain with transition probability
Ass′ = P
(
sk+1 = s′|sk = s) . (3)
In the example of technology diffusion, the target process can denote the availability
of competition or market forces that determine whether a node adopts the technology.
In the model below, the target state will affect the probability that an agent adopts the
new technology.
2.2 SIS Diffusion Model for Information in Social Network
The model we present below for the diffusion of information in the social network is
called the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model [151, 181]. The diffusion of
information is modelled by the time evolution of the state of individual nodes in the
network. Let x(m)k ∈ {0, 1} denote the state at time k of each node m in the social
network. Here, x(m)k = 0 if the agent at time k is susceptible and x
(m)
k = 1 if the agent is
infected. At time k, the state vector of the N nodes is
xk =
[
x(1)k , . . . , x
(N)
k
]′ ∈ {0, 1}N . (4)
Assume that the process x evolves as a discrete time Markov process with transition
law depending on the target state s. If node m has degree D(m) = d, then the probability
of node m switching from state i to j is
P
(
x(m)k+1 = j|x(m)k = i, x(i−)k , sk = s
)
= pi j(d, A
(m)
k , s), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. (5)
Here, A(m)k denotes the number of infected neighbors of node m at time k. That is,
A(m)k =
∑
n∈N(m)
I
{
n : x(m)k = 1
}
. (6)
In words, the transition probability of an agent depends on its degree distribution and
the number of active neighbors.
With the above probabilistic model, we are interested in modelling the evolution of
infected agents over time. Let ρk(d) denote the fraction of infected nodes at each time
k with degree d. We call ρ the infected node distribution. So with d = 0, 1, . . . , D¯,
ρk(d) =
1
N(d)
∑
m∈V
I
{
D(m) = d, x(m)k = 1
}
. (7)
The SIS model assumes that the infection spreads according to the following dynamics:
1. At each time instant k, a single agent, denoted by m, amongst the N agents is cho-
sen uniformly. Therefore, the probability that the chosen agent m is infected and
of degree d is ρk(d) P(d). The probability that the chosen agent m is susceptible
and of degree d is (1 − ρk(d)) P(d).
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2. Depending on whether its state x(m)k is infected or susceptible, the state of agent
m evolves according to the transition probabilities specified in (5).
With the Markov chain transition dynamics of individual agents specified above,
it is clear that the infected distribution ρk =
(
ρk(1), . . . , ρk(D¯)
)
is an
∏D¯
d=1 N(d) state
Markov chain. Indeed, given ρk(d), due to the infection dynamics specified above
ρk+1(d) ∈
{
ρk(d) − 1N(d) , ρk(d) +
1
N(d)
}
. (8)
Our aim below is to specify the transition probabilities of the Markov chain ρ. Let us
start with the following statistic that forms a convenient parametrization of the transi-
tion probabilities. Given the infected node distribution ρk at time k, define θ(ρk) as the
probability that at time k a uniformly sampled link in the network points to an infected
node. We call θ(ρk) as the infected link probability. Clearly
θ(ρk) =
∑D¯
d=1 (# of links from infected node of degree d)∑D¯
d=1 (# of links of degree d)
=
∑D¯
d=1 d P(d) ρk(d)∑D¯
d d P(d)
. (9)
In terms of the infected link probabilities, the scaled transition probabilities2 of the
process ρ are:
p¯01(d, θk, s)
defn
=
1
P(d)
P
(
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N(d)
∣∣∣∣sk = s)
= (1 − ρk(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, s)P(a out of l neighbours infected)
= (1 − ρk(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, s)
(
d
a
)
θak (1 − θk)d−a,
p¯10(d, θk, s)
defn
=
1
P(d)
P
(
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) − 1N(d)
∣∣∣∣sk = s)
= ρk(d)
d∑
a=0
p10(d, a, s)
(
d
a
)
θak (1 − θk)d−a. (10)
In the above, the notation θk is the short form for θ(ρk). The transition probabilities
p¯01 and p¯10 defined above model the diffusion of information about the target state s
over the social network. We have the following martingale representation theorem for
the evolution of Markov process ρ.
Let Fk denote the sigma algebra generated by {ρ0, . . . , ρk, s0, . . . sk}.
2The transition probabilities are scaled by the degree distribution P(d) for notational convenience. Indeed,
since N(d) = NP(d), by using these scaled probabilities we can express the dynamics of the process ρ in
terms of the same-step size 1/N as described in Theorem 2.1. Throughout this chapter, we assume that the
degree distribution P(d), d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D¯}, is uniformly bounded away from zero. That is, mind P(d) >  for
some positive constant .
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Theorem 2.1. For d = 1, 2, . . . , D¯, the infected distributions evolve as
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N
[
p¯01(d, θ(ρk), sk) − p¯10(d, θ(ρk), sk) + wk+1] (11)
where w is a martingale increment process, that is E{wk+1|Fk} = 0. Recall s is the finite
state Markov chain that models the target process. 
The above theorem is a well-known martingale representation of a Markov chain
[58]—it says that a discrete time Markov process can be obtained by discrete time filter-
ing of a martingale increment process. The theorem implies that the infected distribu-
tion dynamics resemble what is commonly called a stochastic approximation (adaptive
filtering) algorithm in statistical signal processing: the new estimate is the old estimate
plus a noisy update (the “noise” being a martingale increment) that is weighed by a
small step size 1/N when N is large. Subsequently, we will exploit the structure in
Theorem 2.1 to devise a mean field dynamics model which has a state of dimension D¯.
This is to be compared with the intractable state dimension
∏D¯
d=1 N(d) of the Markov
chain ρ.
2.3 Mean Field Dynamics of Information Diffusion
The mean field dynamics state that as the number of agents N grows to infinity, the
dynamics of the infected distribution ρ, described by (11), in the social network evolves
according to the following deterministic difference equation that is modulated by a
Markov chain that depends on the target state evolution s:
For d = 1, 2, . . . , D¯,
ρ¯k+1(d) = ρ¯k(d) +
1
N
[
p¯01(d, θ(ρ¯k), sk) − p¯10(d, θ(ρ¯k), sk)]
p¯01(d, θ, sk) = (1 − ρ¯k(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, sk)
(
d
a
)
θa(1 − θ)d−a
p¯10(d, θ, sk) = ρ¯k(d)
d∑
a=0
p10(d, a, sk)
(
d
a
)
θa(1 − θ)d−a
θ(ρ¯k) =
∑D¯
d=1 d P(d) ρ¯k(d)∑D¯
d d P(d)
(12)
That the above mean field dynamics follow from (11) is intuitive. Such averaging
results are well known in the adaptive filtering community where they are deployed to
analyze the convergence of adaptive filters. The difference here is that the limit mean
field dynamics are not deterministic but Markov modulated. Moreover, the mean field
dynamics here constitute a model for information diffusion, rather than the asymptotic
behavior of an adaptive filtering algorithm. As mentioned earlier, from an engineering
point of view, the mean field dynamics yield a tractable model for estimation.
We then have the following exponential bound result for the error of the mean field
dynamics approximation.
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Theorem 2.2. For a discrete time horizon of T points, the deviation between the mean
field dynamics ρ¯k in (12) and actual infected distribution in ρk (11) satisfies
P
{
max
0≤k≤T
‖ρk − ρ¯k‖∞ ≥ 
}
≤ C1 exp(−C22N) (13)
where C1 and C2 are positive constants and T = O(N). 
The proof of the above theorem follows from [21, Lemma 1] and is presented in
[106]. Actually in [21] the mean field dynamics are presented in continuous time as
a system of ordinary differential equations. The exponential bound follows from an
application of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. The above theorem provides an expo-
nential bound (in terms of the number of agents N) for the probability of deviation of
the sample path of the infected distribution from the mean field dynamics for any finite
time interval T .
The stochastic approximation and adaptive filtering literature [22, 114] has several
averaging analysis methods for recursions of the form (11). The well studied mean
square error analysis [22, 114] computes bounds on E‖ρ¯k − ρk‖2 instead of the maxi-
mum deviation in Theorem 2.2. A mean square error analysis of estimating a Markov
modulated empirical distribution is given in [186]. Such mean square analysis assume
a finite but small step size 1/N in (11).
Related Literature
Given the above SIS model, it is appropriate to pause briefly and review related liter-
ature. There are several other models for studying the spread of infection and tech-
nology in complex networks including Susceptible-Alert-Infected-Susceptible (SAIS),
and Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Vigilant (SEIV); see [86, 57]. Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) models have been extensively studied in [130, 93, 151, 181, 109] to
model information/infection diffusion, for example, the adoption of a new technology
in a consumer market.
Degree-based mean field dynamics approximations for SIS models have been de-
rived in [130, 154]. Pair approximations (PA) and approximate master equations (AME)
yield more general models for the complex dynamics of large scale networks [154].
However, the resulting differential/difference equations that characterize the dynamics
in PA and AME are no longer polynomial functions of the state. In this more gen-
eral case, however, a suboptimal filter such as a particle filter can be used to track the
infection diffusion.
It is also important to note that the right hand side of the mean field difference
equation (12) is a polynomial function of the infected degree distribution ρ¯. As a result,
when the graph is sampled, resulting in noisy observations of ρ¯, one can construct an
exact finite dimensional Bayesian filter for the conditional mean estimate of ρ¯ at each
time k using the filtering algorithms in [85]. We refer the reader to [108] for details and
also posterior Cramer-Rao lower bounds for estimating the infected degree distribution
in the case of Erdos-Rényi and also power law (scale free) networks such as Twitter.
In comparison, [78] provides a stochastic approximation algorithm and analysis on a
Hilbert space for tracking the degree distribution of evolving random networks with a
duplication-deletion model.
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On networks having fixed degree distribution, [130] identified conditions under
which a network is susceptible to an epidemic using a mean-field approach and pro-
vided a closed form solution for the infection diffusion threshold. The diffusion proper-
ties of networks was investigated using stochastic dominance of their underlying degree
distributions like in [94]. We generalize these stochastic dominance results for evolving
networks by considering a simple preferential attachment model as this can generate a
scale-free network [67].
Finally, [151] studies the link between the power law exponent and the diffusion
threshold. For the preferential attachment model, [67] studies the connection between
the parameters that dictate the evolution (node and edge addition probability) and the
degree distribution. [108] has similar results using stochastic dominance, but, the key
emphasis is on providing a structured way to study such ordinal sensitivity relationships
in large networks.
Numerical Example
We simulate the diffusion of information through a network comprising of N = 100
nodes (with maximum degree D¯ = 17). It is assumed that at time k = 0, 5% of nodes
are infected. The mean field dynamics model is investigated in terms of the infected
link probability (9). The infected link probability θ(ρk) is computed using (12).
Assume each agent is a myopic optimizer and, hence, chooses to adopt the tech-
nology only if c(m) ≤ A(m)k ; r = 1. At time k, the costs c(m), m = 1, 2, . . . , 100, are
i.i.d. random variables simulated from uniform distribution U[0,C(sk)]. Therefore, the
transition probabilities in (5) are
p01(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = P
(
c(m) ≤ A(m)k
)
=
 A
(m)
k )
C(sk)
, A(m)k ≤ C(sk),
1, A(m)k > C(sk).
(14)
The probability that a product fails is pF = 0.3, i.e.,
p10(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = 0.3.
The infected link probabilities obtained from network simulation (9) and from the
discrete-time mean field dynamics model (12) are illustrated in Figure 3. To illustrate
that the infected link probability computed from (12) follows the true one (obtained by
network simulation), we assume that the value of C jumps from 1 to 10 at time k = 200,
and from 10 to 1 at time k = 500. As can be seen in Figure 3, the mean field dynamics
provide an excellent approximation to the true infected distribution.
2.4 Example: Social Sensing of Influenza using Twitter
In this section, we utilize datasets from 3 different social networks (namely, (i) Harvard
college social network, (ii) influenza datasets from the U.S Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and (iii) Twitter, to show how Twitter can be used as a real time
social sensor for detecting outbreaks of influenza.
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Figure 3: The infected link probability obtained from network simulation compared to
the one obtained from the mean field dynamics model (12). The transition probabili-
ties in (14) depend only on the number of infected neighbors A(m)k (the parameters are
defined in Scenario 1).
2.4.1 Twitter as a social sensor
A key advantage of using social media for rapid sensing of disease outbreaks in health
networks is that it is low cost and provides rapid results compared with traditional
techniques. For example, CDC must contact thousands of hospitals to query the data
which causes a reporting lag of approximately one to two weeks [47]. Using real time
microblogging platforms such as Twitter for disease detection has several advantages:
the tweets are publicly available, high tweet posting frequency users often provide
meta-data (i.e. city, gender, age), and Twitter contains a diverse set of users [47].
Several papers have considered using Twitter data for estimating influenza infection
rates. In [165, 188] support vector regression supervised learning algorithms is used to
relate the volume of Twitter posts that contain specific words (i.e. flu, swine, influenza)
to the number of confirmed influenza cases in the U.S. as reported by the CDC. Multiple
linear regression [46, 48], and unsupervised Bayesian algorithms [124] have been used
to relate the number of tweets of specific words to the influenza rate reported by the
CDC. The detection algorithms [165, 46, 124] do not consider the dynamics of the
disease propagation and the dynamics of information diffusion in the Twitter network.
To reduce the effect of information diffusion in the network, [32] proposes a support
vector machine (SVM) classifier to detect: a) if the tweet indicates the users awareness
of influenza or indicates the user is infected, and b) if the influenza reference is in
reference to another person. The classified tweets are then used to train a multiple
linear regression model. To account for the diffusion dynamics of Twitter [4, 3] utilize
an Autoregressive with Exogenous input (ARX) model. The exogenous input is the
number of unique Twitter users with influenza related tweets, and the output is the
number of infected users as reported by the CDC.
If the social network is known then the influenza spread can be formulated in terms
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of the diffusion model (11). Given the U.S. population of several hundred millions,
it is reasonable to adopt the mean field dynamics (12). With the influenza infection
rate modelled using (12), the results can be used as an exogenous input to an ARX
or Nonlinear ARX (NARX) models to predict the volume of Twitter messages related
to influenza as illustrated in Fig.2. In this framework, the Twitter messages are used
to validate the underlying propagation model of influenza of use for predicting the
infection rate and outbreak detection.
2.4.2 Social Network Influenza Dataset
We consider the dataset [43] obtained from a social network of 744 undergraduate
students from Harvard College. The health of the 744 students was monitored from
September 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009 and was reported by the university Health
Services. To construct the social network, students were presented with a background
questionnaire. In the questionnaire students are asked: “Please provide the contact in-
formation for 2-3 Harvard College students who you know and who you think would
like to participate in this study”, and “...provide us with the names and contact infor-
mation of 2-3 of your friends...”. This information was used to construct the degree
distribution and links of the social network. A movie containing the spread of the in-
fluenza in the 744 college students over the 122 day sampling period can be viewed as
the Youtube video titled “Social Network Sensors for Early Detection of Contagious
Outbreaks" at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TD06g2m8qM. Fig.4(a-c) dis-
play 3 illustrative snapshots from this video; red nodes denote infected students while
yellow nodes depict their neighbors in the social network.
2.4.3 Models for Influenza Diffusion
From the data in the youtube video for the Harvard students, we observed the fol-
lowing regarding the transition probabilities pi j(d, A, s) defined in (5). As expected,
students with a larger number of infected neighbors A contract influenza sooner. The
data shows that the transition probabilities were approximately independent of the de-
gree of the node d. Since the data provided was during an actual influenza outbreak we
set the target state of the network (i.e. s) constant. Therefore the transition probabilities
depend only on the number of infected neighbours and were estimated as
p01(a = 1) = 0.02, p01(a = 2) = 0.15.
That is, the dataset reveals that the probability of getting infected given a = 2 infected
neighbors is substantially higher than with a = 1 infected neighbor, as expected. The
estimated infected link probability θk in (9) versus time (days) k is displayed in Fig.4(d).
Recall from Sec.2.3 that the infected link probability θk is related to the mean field
dynamics equation (12). This allows the transition probabilities and θk to be used to
predict the infection rate dynamics.
Other graph-theoretic measures also play a role in the analysis of the diffusion.
Students with high k-coreness3 are expected to contract influenza earlier. Additionally,
3k-coreness is the largest subnetwork comprising nodes of degree at least k
16
students that have high betweenness centrality (i.e. number of shortest paths from
all students to all others that pass through that student) contract influenza earlier then
students with low betweenness centrality. These observations show that the diffusion of
influenza in the network depends strongly on the underlying health network structure.
The dynamic model (7) accounts for the effects of the degree of nodes, however to
account for the effects from betweenness centrality and k-coreness would require a
more sophisticated formulation then that presented in Sec.2.1.
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Figure 4: Snapshots from youtube video of Harvard undergraduate social network
propagation of influenza and the estimated infected link probability θk (9) for Octo-
ber 10 to December 23, 2009.
2.4.4 Time series model for Influenza Tweets
In Sec.2.4.3 we illustrated how the mean field dynamics model (12) can be used to
estimate the influenza infection rate with the model parameters estimated from a sam-
pled set of the entire population. To validate the estimated parameters for the entire
network requires that the infection rate be related to an observable response, in this
case the number of Twitter mentions of a specific keyword. Two time series models
are considered for relating the infection rate to the number of Twitter mentions. The
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models are validated using two real-world datasets of Twitter mentions and number of
influenza cases in the U.S..
The number of influenza cases in the U.S. is obtained from the CDC4 which pub-
lishes weekly reports from the U.S. outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance Net-
work (ILInet). The data reported by the CDC is comprised of reports from over 3000
health providers nationwide and was obtained for the dates between September 1, 2012
to October 1, 2013. The associated Twitter data for the 122 day period was obtained
using the software PeopleBrowsr5. The pre-specified Twitter search terms used are:
flu, swine and influenza. Since our focus is on monitoring influenza dynamics in the
U.S., we excluded all tweets as tagged as originating from outside the U.S. The total
number of mentions of a specific keyword on each is obtained using PeopleBrowsr.
We used two time series models for the volume of tweets and compared their per-
formance. The first time series model considered is the ARX model defined by:
τk =
na∑
i=1
aiτk−i +
nb−1∑
i=0
biρk−∆−i + d + vk. (15)
In (15), τk is the number of influenza related tweets at k, ρk is the exogenous input of
the infected influenza patients, na, nb, ai, bi,∆ and d are model parameters with vk an
iid noise process. ∆ models the delay between patient contraction, and the respective
individual tweeting their symptoms. d models the mean number of tweets related to
influenza that are not related to an actual infection.
The second time series model we used is the nonlinear autoregressive exogenous
(NARX) model given by:
τk = F(τk−1, . . . , τk−na , ρk−∆, . . . , ρk−∆−nb ) + vk. (16)
In (16) F denotes a nonlinear function which relates the exogenous input and previous
tweets to the current number of tweets. Here we consider F as a support vector machine
which can be trained using historical data. Note that if F was independent of previous
tweets, previous exogenous inputs, and no delay (i.e. nb = 0 and ∆ = 0), then (16)
would be identical to the SVM classifier used in [165, 188] to relate the number of
tweets to number of infected agents.
The number of reported influenza cases, associated Twitter data, and results of the
model training and prediction are displayed in Fig.5 for the ARX (15) and NARX (16)
models. As seen from Fig.5(a) ,the dominant word for indicating a possible influenza
outbreak is flu as compared with swine and influenza. Notice that there is a lag between
the maximum confirmed influenza cases and the # of tweets; however, there is an in-
crease in the number of tweets prior to the peak of infected patients. These dynamics
are a result of a combination of infection propagation dynamics and the diffusion of
information on Twitter. To account for these dynamics the ARX and NARX models
presented in Sec.2.4.4 are utilized. The training and prediction accuracy of these mod-
els for na = 0, nb = 2 (i.e model input parameters ρk−∆ and ρk−∆−1) are displayed in
Fig.5(b). As seen, the NARX (16) model provides a superior estimate as compared with
4http://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/fluview/fluportaldashboard.html
5http://gr.peoplebrowsr.com/
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the ARX model (15). Interestingly there is a ∆ = 18 day delay between the maximum
number of infected patients and the maximum number of Twitter mentions containing
the word flu. This is contrast to the dynamics observed for the 2009 [165] and 2010-
2011 [3] influenza outbreaks which show that the increase in Twitter mentions occurs
earlier or at the same time as the number of infected patients increases. This also
emphasizes the importance of using the mean field dynamics model for influenza prop-
agation as compared with only using Twitter data for predicting the influenza infection
rate. Here we have used the CDC data to estimate the number of infected agents, how-
ever the mean field dynamics model (12) could be used to estimate the dynamics of
disease propagation and relate this to the observable number of tweets in real-time.
To summarize, the above datasets illustrate how Twitter can be used as a sensor for
monitoring the spread of influenza in a heath network. The propagation of influenza
was modeled according to the SIS model and the dynamics of tweets according to an
autoregressive model.
2.5 Sentiment-Based Sensing Mechanism
In the above dataset, samples of influenza affected individuals were obtained from a
Harvard college social network. More generally, it is often necessary to sample individ-
uals in a social network to estimate an underlying state of nature such as the sentiment.
An important question regarding sensing in a social network is: How can one construct
a small but representative sample of a social network with a large number of nodes?
In [123] several scale-down and back-in-time sampling procedures are studied. Below
we review three sampling schemes. The simplest possible sampling scheme is uniform
sampling. We also briefly describe social sampling and respondent-driven sampling
which are recent methods that have become increasingly popular.
2.5.1 Uniform Sampling
Consider the following sampling-based measurement strategy. At each period k, α(d)
individuals are sampled6 independently and uniformly from the population N(d) com-
prising of agents with connectivity degree d. That is, a uniform distributed i.i.d. se-
quence of nodes, denoted by{ml, l = 1 : α(d)}, is generated from the population N(d).
The messages y(ml)k of these α(d) individuals are recorded. From these independent
samples, the empirical sentiment distribution zk(d) of degree d nodes at each time k is
obtained as
zk(d, y) =
1
α(d)
α(d)∑
l=1
I
{
y(ml)k = y
}
, y = 1, . . . ,Y. (17)
At each time k, the empirical sentiment distribution zk can be viewed as noisy observa-
tions of the infected distribution ρk and target state process sk.
6For large population sizes N, sampling with and without replacement are equivalent.
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(a) Experimental data of # of tweets and # of Infected with
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(b) ARX model (15) and NARX model (16) for the # of tweets
given the # of infected influenza patients. The ARX and
NARX models are trained using the initial 200 days of data.
The predictive accuracy of the models is illustrated for the re-
maining 230 days.
Figure 5: The experimental data is obtained for September 2012 to October 2013 as
described in Sec.2.4.2. The ARX (15) and NARX (16) models are utilized to estimate
the number of tweets with flu given the number of infected influenza patients.
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2.5.2 Social Sampling
Social sampling is an extensive area of research; see [49] for recent results. In social
sampling, participants in a poll respond with a summary of their friend’s responses.
This leads to a reduction in the number of samples required. If the average degree of
nodes in the network is d, then the savings in the number of samples is by a factor of d,
since a randomly chosen node summarizes the results form d of its friends. However,
the variance and bias of the estimate depend strongly on the social network structure7.
In [49], a social sampling method is introduced and analyzed where nodes of degree
d are sampled with probability proportional to 1/d. This is intuitive since weighing
neighbors’ values by the reciprocal of the degree undoes the bias introduced by large
degree nodes. It then illustrates this social sampling method and variants on the Live-
Journal network (livejournal.com) comprising of more than 5 million nodes and 160
million directed edges.
2.5.3 MCMC Based Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS)
Respondent-driven sampling (RDS) was introduced by Heckathorn [82, 83, 120] as
an approach for sampling from hidden populations in social networks and has gained
enormous popularity in recent years. There are more than 120 RDS studies worldwide
involving sex workers and injection drug users [132]. As mentioned in [69], the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently selected RDS for a 25-city
study of injection drug users that is part of the National HIV Behavioral Surveillance
System [117].
RDS is a variant of the well known method of snowball sampling where current
sample members recruit future sample members. The RDS procedure is as follows:
A small number of people in the target population serve as seeds. After participating
in the study, the seeds recruit other people they know through the social network in
the target population. The sampling continues according to this procedure with current
sample members recruiting the next wave of sample members until the desired sam-
pling size is reached. Typically, monetary compensations are provided for participating
in the data collection and recruitment.
RDS can be viewed as a form of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling
(see [69] for an excellent exposition). Let {ml, l = 1 : α(d)} be the realization of an ape-
riodic irreducible Markov chain with state space N(d) comprising of nodes of degree
d. This Markov chain models the individuals of degree d that are snowball sampled,
namely, the first individual m1 is sampled and then recruits the second individual m2
to be sampled, who then recruits m3 and so on. Instead of the independent sample
7In [49], nice intuition is provided in terms of intent polling and expectation polling. In intent polling,
individual are sampled and asked who they intend to vote for. In expectation polling, individuals are sampled
and asked who they think would win the election. For a given sample size, one would believe that expecta-
tion polling is more accurate than intent polling since in expectation polling, an individual would typically
consider its own intent together with the intents of its friends.
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estimator (17), an asymptotically unbiased MCMC estimate is then generated as
∑α(d)
l=1
I(y(ml )k =y)
pi(ml)∑α(d)
l=1
1
pi(ml)
(18)
where pi(m), m ∈ N(d), denotes the stationary distribution of the Markov chain. For
example, a reversible Markov chain with prescribed stationary distribution is straight-
forwardly generated by the Metropolis Hastings algorithm.
In RDS, the transition matrix and, hence, the stationary distribution pi in the es-
timator (18) is specified as follows: Assume that edges between any two nodes m
and n have symmetric weights W(m, n) (i.e., W(m, n) = W(n,m), equivalently, the
network is undirected). In RDS, node m recruits node n with transition probability
W(m, n)/
∑
n W(m, n). Then, it can be easily seen that the stationary distribution is
pi(m) =
∑
n∈V W(m, n)/
∑
m∈V,n∈V W(m, n). Using this stationary distribution, along with
the above transition probabilities for sampling agents in (18), yields the RDS algorithm.
It is well known that a Markov chain over a non-bipartite connected undirected
network G is aperiodic. Then, the initial seed for the RDS algorithm can be picked
arbitrarily, and the above estimator is an asymptotically unbiased estimator.
Note the difference between RDS and social sampling: RDS uses the network to
recruit the next respondent, whereas social sampling seeks to reduce the number of
samples by using people’s knowledge of their friends’ (neighbors’) opinions.
Finally, the reader may be familiar with the DARPA network challenge in 2009
where the locations of 10 red balloons in the continental US were to be determined
using social networking. In this case, the winning MIT Red Balloon Challenge Team
used a recruitment based sampling method. The strategy can also be viewed as a variant
of the Query Incentive Network model of [101].
2.6 Summary and Extensions
This section has discussed the diffusion of information in social networks. Mean field
dynamics were used to approximate the asymptotic infected degree distribution. An
illustrative example of the spread of influenza was provided. Finally, methods for sam-
pling the population in a social networks were reviews. Below we discuss some related
concepts and extensions.
Bayesian Filtering Problem
Given the sentiment observations described above, how can the infected degree distri-
bution ρk and target state sk be estimated at each time instant? The partially observed
state space model with dynamics (12) and discrete time observations from sampling the
network can be use to obtain Bayesian filtering estimates of the underlying state of na-
ture. Computing the conditional mean estimate sk, ρk given the sentiment observation
sequence is a Bayesian filtering problem. In fact, filtering of such jump Markov linear
systems have been studied extensively in the signal processing literature [56, 128] and
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can be solved via the use of sequential Markov chain Monte-Carlo methods. For ex-
ample, [162] reports on how a particle filter is used to localize earthquake events using
Twitter as a social sensor.
Reactive Information Diffusion
A key difference between social sensors and conventional sensors in statistical signal
processing is that social sensors are reactive: A social sensor uses additional infor-
mation gained to modify its behavior. Consider the case where the sentiment-based
observation process is made available in a public blog. Then, these observations will
affect the transition dynamics of the agents and, therefore, the mean field dynamics.
How Does Connectivity Affect Mean Field Equilibrium?
The papers [129, 130] examine the structure of fixed points of the mean field differential
equation (12) when the underlying target process s is not present (equivalently, s is a
one state process). They consider the case where the agent transition probabilities
are parametrized by p01(d, a) = µF(d, a) and p10 = pF . Then, defining λ = µ/pF ,
they study how the following two thresholds behave with the degree distribution and
diffusion mechanism:
1. Critical threshold λc: This is defined as the minimum value of λ for which there
exists a fixed point of (12) with positive fraction of infected agents, i.e., ρ∞(d) >
0 for some d and, for λ ≤ λc, such a fixed point does not exist.
2. Diffusion threshold λd: Suppose the initial condition ρ0 for the infected distri-
bution is infinitesimally small. Then, λd is the minimum value of λ for which
ρ∞(d) > 0 for some d, and such that, for λ ≤ λd, ρ∞(d) = 0 for all d.
Determining how these thresholds vary with degree distribution and diffusion mech-
anism is very useful for understanding the long term behavior of agents in the social
network.
3 Bayesian Social Learning Models for Online Reputa-
tion Systems
In this section we address the second topic of the chapter, namely, Bayesian social
learning amongst social sensors. The motivation can be understood in terms of the
following social sensing example. Consider the following interactions in a multi-agent
social network where agents seek to estimate an underlying state of nature. Each agent
visits a restaurant based on reviews on an online reputation website. The agent then
obtains a private measurement of the state (e.g., the quality of food in a restaurant)
in noise. After that, he reviews the restaurant on the same online reputation website.
The information exchange in the social network is modelled by a directed graph. Data
incest [110] arises due to loops in the information exchange graph. This is illustrated
in the graph of Fig.6. Agents 1 and 2 exchange beliefs (or actions) as depicted in Fig.6.
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The fact that there are two distinct paths between Agent 1 at time 1 and Agent 1 at time
3 (these paths are denoted in red) implies that the information of Agent 1 at time 1 is
double counted leading to a data incest event.
Figure 6: Example of the information flow (communication graph) in a social net-
work with two agents and over three event epochs. The arrows represent exchange of
information.
How can data incest be removed so that agents obtain a fair (unbiased) estimate of
the underlying state? The methodology of this section can be interpreted in terms of the
recent Time article [173] which provides interesting rules for online reputation systems.
These include: (i) review the reviewers, and (ii) censor fake (malicious) reviewers. The
data incest removal algorithm proposed in this chapter can be viewed as “reviewing the
reviews" of other agents to see if they are associated with data incest or not.
The rest of this section is organized as follows:
1. Sec.3.1 describes the social learning model that is used to mimic the behavior
of agents in online reputation systems. Sec.3.2 describes how risk averse social
learning models apply to detecting market shocks in high frequency financial
systems.
2. Sec.3.3 to Sec.3.5 deal with modelling data incest and incest removal algorithms
for online reputation systems. The information exchange between agents in the
social network is formulated on a family of time dependent directed acyclic
graphs. achieves a fair rating. A necessary and sufficient condition is given on
the graph structure of information exchange between agents so that a fair rating
is achievable.
3. Sec.3.6 discusses conditions under which treating individual social sensors as
Bayesian optimizers is a useful idealization of their behavior. In particular, it
is shown that the ordinal behavior of humans can be mimicked by Bayesian
optimizers under reasonable conditions.
4. Sec.3.7 presents a dataset obtained from a psychology experiment to illustrate
social learning and data incest patterns.
Related work Collaborative recommendation systems are reviewed and studied in
[6, 102]. The books [36, 57] study information cascades in social learning. In [96], a
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model of Bayesian social learning is considered in which agents receive private infor-
mation about the state of nature and observe actions of their neighbors in a tree-based
network. Another type of mis-information caused by influential agents (agents who
heavily affect actions of other agents in social networks) is investigated in [2]. Mis-
information in the context of this chapter is motivated by sensor networks where the
term “data incest" is used [110]. Data incest also arises in Belief Propagation (BP)
algorithms [152, 140] which are used in computer vision and error-correcting cod-
ing theory. BP algorithms require passing local messages over the graph (Bayesian
network) at each iteration. For graphical models with loops, BP algorithms are only
approximate due to the over-counting of local messages [185] which is similar to data
incest in social learning. With the algorithms presented in this section, data incest can
be mitigated from Bayesian social learning over non-tree graphs that satisfy a topologi-
cal constraint. The closest work to the current chapter is [110]. However, in [110], data
incest is considered in a network where agents exchange their private belief states -
that is, no social learning is considered. Simpler versions of this information exchange
process and estimation were investigated in [16, 65, 29]. We also refer the reader to
[40] for a discussion of recommender systems.
3.1 Classical Social Learning
We briefly review the classical social learning model for the interaction of individuals.
Subsequently, we will deal with more general models over a social network.
Consider a multi-agent system that aims to estimate the state of an underlying finite
state random variable x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X} with known prior distribution pi0. Each
agent acts once in a predetermined sequential order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . Assume at
the beginning of iteration k, all agents have access to the public belief pik−1 defined in
Step (iv) below. The social learning protocol proceeds as follows [25, 36]:
(i) Private Observation: At time k, agent k records a private observation yk ∈ Y from
the observation distribution Biy = P(y|x = i), i ∈ X. Throughout this section we assume
that Y = {1, 2, . . . ,Y} is finite.
(ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief pik−1 available at time k−1 (Step (iv) below),
agent k updates its private posterior belief ηk(i) = P(xk = i|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk) using Bayes
formula:
ηk =
Bykpi
1′X Bypi
, Byk = diag(P(yk |x = i), i ∈ X). (19)
Here 1X denotes the X-dimensional vector of ones, ηk is an X-dimensional probability
mass function (pmf).
(iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action ak ∈ A = {1, 2, . . . , A} to minimize its ex-
pected cost
ak = arg min
a∈A E{c(x, a)|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk} = arg mina∈A {c
′
aηk}. (20)
Here ca = (c(i, a), i ∈ X) denotes an X dimensional cost vector, and c(i, a) denotes the
cost incurred when the underlying state is i and the agent chooses action a.
Agent k then broadcasts its action ak.
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(iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action ak of agent k, and the public belief pik−1,
each subsequent agent k′ > k performs social learning to update the public belief pik
according to the “social learning filter":
pik = T (pik−1, ak), where T (pi, a) =
Rpia pi
σ(pi, a)
, (21)
where σ(pi, a) = 1′XR
pi
aP
′pi is the normalization factor of the Bayesian update. In (21),
the public belief pik(i) = P(xk = i|a1, . . . ak) and Rpia = diag(P(a|x = i, pi), i ∈ X) has
elements
P(ak = a|xk = i, pik−1 = pi) =
∑
y∈Y
P(a|y, pi)P(y|xk = i)
P(ak = a|y, pi) =
1 if c′aByP′pi ≤ c′a˜ByP′pi, a˜ ∈ A0 otherwise.
The following result which is well known in the economics literature [25, 36] states
that if agents follow the above social learning protocol, then after some finite time k¯,
an information cascade occurs.8
Theorem 3.1 ([25]). The social learning protocol leads to an information cascade in
finite time with probability 1. That is, after some finite time k¯ social learning ceases
and the public belief pik+1 = pik, k ≥ k¯, and all agents choose the same action ak+1 = ak,
k ≥ k¯. 
Instead of reproducing the proof, let us give some insight as to why Theorem 3.1
holds. It can be shown using martingale methods that at some finite time k = k∗, the
agent’s probability P(ak |yk, pik−1) becomes independent of the private observation yk.
Then clearly, P(ak = a|xk = i, pik−1) = P(ak = a|pi). Substituting this into the social
learning filter (21), we see that pik = pik−1. Thus after some finite time k∗, the social
learning filter hits a fixed point and social learning stops. As a result, all subsequent
agents k > k∗ completely disregard their private observations and take the same action
ak∗ , thereby forming an information cascade (and therefore a herd).
3.2 Risk Averse Social Learning and Detecting Market Shocks
Here we consider the statistical signal processing problem involving agent based mod-
els of financial markets which at a micro-level are driven by socially aware and risk-
averse trading agents. These agents trade (buy or sell) stocks at each trading instant
by using the decisions of all previous agents (social learning) in addition to a private
(noisy) signal they receive on the value of the stock. We are interested in the follow-
ing: (1) Modelling the dynamics of these risk averse agents, (2) Sequential detection
8 A herd of agents takes place at time k¯, if the actions of all agents after time k¯ are identical, i.e., ak = ak¯
for all time k > k¯. An information cascade implies that a herd of agents occur. [172] quotes the following
anecdote of user influence and herding in a social network: “... when a popular blogger left his blogging site
for a two-week vacation, the site’s visitor tally fell, and content produced by three invited substitute bloggers
could not stem the decline."
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of a market shock based on the behaviour of these agents. Structural results which
characterize social learning under a risk measure, CVaR (Conditional Value-at-risk),
are presented and formulation of the Bayesian change point detection problem is pro-
vided. The structural results exhibit two interesting properties: (i) Risk averse agents
herd more often than risk neutral agents (ii) The stopping set in the sequential detection
problem is non-convex.
It is well documented in behavioural economics [44] and psychology [55] that peo-
ple prefer a certain but possibly less desirable outcome over an uncertain but potentially
larger outcome. To model this risk averse behaviour, commonly used risk measures9
are Value-at-Risk (VaR), Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), Entropic risk measure and
Tail value at risk; see [138]. We consider social learning under CVaR risk measure.
CVaR [158] is an extension of VaR that gives the total loss given a loss event and is
a coherent risk measure [14]. Below, we choose CVaR risk measure as it exhibits the
following properties [14], [158]: (i) It associates higher risk with higher cost. (ii) It
ensures that risk is not a function of the quantity purchased, but arises from the stock.
(iii) It is convex. CVaR as a risk measure has been used in solving portfolio optimiza-
tion problems [149], [125] and order execution. For an overview of risk measures and
their application in finance, see [138].
CVaR Social Learning Model
The market micro-structure is modelled as a discrete time dealer market motivated by
algorithmic and high-frequency tick-by-tick trading [34]. There is a single traded stock
or asset, a market observer and a countable number of trading agents. The asset has
an initial true underlying value x0 ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X}. The market observer does not
receive direct information about x ∈ X but only observes the public buy/sell actions
of agents, ak ∈ A = {1(buy), 2(sell)}. The agents themselves receive noisy private
observations of the underlying value x and consider this in addition to the trading de-
cisions of the other agents visible in the order book. At a random time, τ0 determined
by the transition matrix P, the asset experiences a jump change in its value to a new
value. The aim of the market observer is to detect the change time (global decision)
with minimal cost, having access to only the actions of these socially aware agents. Let
yk ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . ,Y} denote agent k’s private observation. The initial distribution is
pi0 = (pi0(i), i ∈ X) where pi0(i) = P(x0 = i).
The agent based model has the following dynamics:
1. Shock in the asset value: At time τ0 > 0, the asset experiences a jump change
(shock) in its value due to exogenous factors. The change point τ0 is modelled by
a phase type (PH) distribution. The family of all PH-distributions forms a dense
subset for the set of all distributions [144] i.e., for any given distribution function
F such that F(0) = 0, one can find a sequence of PH-distributions {Fn, n ≥ 1}
9A risk measure % : L → R is a mapping from the space of measurable functions to the real line which
satisfies the following properties: (i) %(0) = 0. (ii) If S 1, S 2 ∈ L and S 1 ≤ S 2 a.s then %(S 1) ≤ %(S 2). (iii)
if a ∈ R and S ∈ L, then %(S + a) = %(S ) + a. The risk measure is coherent if in addition % satisfies: (iv) If
S 1, S 2 ∈ L, then %(S 1 + S 2) ≤ %(S 1) + %(S 1). (v) If a ≥ 0 and S ∈ L, then %(aS ) = a%(S ). The expectation
operator is a special case where subadditivity is replaced by additivity.
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to approximate F uniformly over [0,∞). The PH-distributed time τ0 can be
constructed via a multi-state Markov chain xk with state space X = {1, . . . , X}
as follows: Assume state ‘1’ is an absorbing state and denotes the state after
the jump change. The states 2, . . . , X (corresponding to beliefs e2, . . . , eX) can
be viewed as a single composite state that x resides in before the jump. So
τ0 = inf{k : xk = 1} and the transition probability matrix P is of the form
P =
[
1 0
P(X−1)×1 P¯(X−1)×(X−1)
]
(22)
The distribution of the absorption time to state 1 is
ν0 = pi0(1), νk = p¯i′0P¯
k−1P, k ≥ 1, (23)
where p¯i0 = [pi0(2), . . . , pi0(X)]′. The key idea is that by appropriately choosing
the pair (pi0, P) and the associated state space dimension X, one can approximate
any given discrete distribution on [0,∞) by the distribution {νk, k ≥ 0}; see [144,
pp.240-243]. The event {xk = 1} means the change point has occurred before
time k according to PH-distribution (23). In the special case when x is a 2-state
Markov chain, the change time τ0 is geometrically distributed.
2. Agent’s Private Observation: Agent k’s private (local) observation denoted by
yk is a noisy measurement of the true value of the asset. It is obtained from the
observation likelihood distribution as,
Bxy = P(yk = y|xk = x) (24)
3. Private Belief update: Agent k updates its private belief using the observation
yk and the prior public belief pik−1(i) = P(X = i|a1, . . . , ak−1) as the following
Hidden Markov Model update
ηk =
Byk P
′pik−1
1′Byk P′pik−1
(25)
where 1 denotes the X-dimensional vector of ones.
4. Agent’s trading decision: Agent k executes an action ak ∈ A = {1(buy), 2(sell)}
to myopically minimize its cost. Let c(i, a) denote the cost incurred if the agent
takes action a when the underlying state is i. Let the local cost vector be
ca = [c(1, a) c(2, a) . . . c(X, a)] (26)
The costs for different actions are taken as
c(i, j) = p j − βi j for i ∈ X, j ∈ A (27)
where βi j corresponds to the agent’s demand. Here demand is the agent’s desire
and willingness to trade at a price p j for the stock. Here p1 is the quoted price
for purchase and p2 is the price demanded in exchange for the stock. We assume
that the price is the same during the period in which the value changes. As a
result, the willingness of each agent only depends on the degree of uncertainty
on the value of the stock.
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Remark 3.2. The analysis provided in this paper straightforwardly extends to
the case when different agents are facing different prices like in an order book.
For notational simplicity we assume the cost are time invariant.
The agent considers measures of risk in the presence of uncertainty in order to
overcome the losses incurred in trading. To illustrate this, let c(x, a) denote the
loss incurred with action a while at unknown and random state x ∈ X. When
an agent solves an optimization problem involving c(x, a) for selecting the best
trading decision, it will take into account not just the expected loss, but also the
“riskiness" associated with the trading decision a. The agent therefore chooses
an action ak to minimize the CVaR measure10 of trading as
ak = argmin
a∈A
{CVaRα(c(xk, a))} (28)
= argmin
a∈A
{min
z∈R {z +
1
α
Eyk [max{(c(xk, a) − z), 0}]}}
Here α ∈ (0, 1] reflects the degree of risk-aversion for the agent (the smaller α
is, the more risk-averse the agent is). Define
Hk := σ- algebra generated by (a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, yk) (29)
Eyk denotes the expectation with respect to private belief, i.e, Eyk = E[.|Hk] when
the private belief is updated after observation yk.
5. Social Learning and Public belief update: Agent k’s action is recorded in the
order book and hence broadcast publicly. Subsequent agents and the market
observer update the public belief on the value of the stock according to the social
learning Bayesian filter as follows
pik = T pik−1 (pik−1, ak) =
Rpik−1ak P
′pik−1
1′Rpik−1ak P′pik−1
(30)
Here, Rpik−1ak = diag(P(ak |x = i, pik−1), i ∈ X), where P(ak |x = i, pik−1) =
∑
y∈Y
P(ak |y, pik−1)P(y|xk =
i) and
P(ak |y, pik−1) =
 1 if ak = argmina∈A CVaRζ(c(xk, a));0 otherwise.
Note that pik belongs to the unit simplex Π(X)
∆
={pi ∈ RX : 1′Xpi = 1, 0 ≤ pi ≤
1 for all i ∈ X}.
6. Market Observer’s Action: The market observer (securities dealer) seeks to
achieve quickest detection by balancing delay with false alarm. At each time
10 For the reader unfamiliar with risk measures, it should be noted that CVaR is one of the ‘big’ develop-
ments in risk modelling in finance in the last 15 years. In comparison, the value at risk (VaR) is the percentile
loss namely, VaRα(x) = min{z : Fx(z) ≥ α} for cdf Fx. While CVaR is a coherent risk measure, VaR is not
convex and so not coherent. CVaR has other remarkable properties [158]: it is continuous in α and jointly
convex in (x, α). For continuous cdf Fx, CVaRα(x) = E{X|X > VaRα(x)}. Note that the variance is not a
coherent risk measure.
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k, the market observer chooses action11 uk as
uk ∈ U = {1(stop), 2(continue)} (31)
Here ‘Stop’ indicates that the value has changed and the dealer incorporates this
information before selling new issues to investors. The formulation presented
considers a general parametrization of the costs associated with detection delay
and false alarm costs. Define
Gk := σ- algebra generated by (a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, ak). (32)
i) Cost of Stopping: The asset experiences a jump change(shock) in its value
at time τ0. If the action uk = 1 is chosen before the change point, a false
alarm penalty is incurred. This corresponds to the event ∪
i≥2
{xk = i} ∩ {uk =
1}. Let I denote the indicator function. The cost of false alarm in state
i, i ∈ X with fi ≥ 0 is thus given by fiI(xk = i, uk = 1). The expected false
alarm penalty is
C(pik, uk = 1) =
∑
i∈X
fiE{I(xk = i, uk = 1)|Gk}
= f′pik (33)
where f = ( f1, . . . , fX) and it is chosen with increasing elements, so that
states further from ‘1’ incur higher false alarm penalties. Clearly, f1 = 0.
ii) Cost of delay: A delay cost is incurred when the event {xk = 1, uk = 2}
occurs, i.e, even though the state changed at k, the market observer fails to
identify the change. The expected delay cost is
C(pik, uk = 2) = d E{I(xk = i, uk = 1)|Gk}
= de′1pik (34)
where d > 0 is the delay cost and e1 denotes the unit vector with 1 in the
first position.
Fig. 7 illustrates the above social learning model in which the information exchange
between the risk-averse social sensors is sequential.
Market Observer’s Quickest Detection Objective
The market observer chooses its action at each time k as
uk = µ(pik) ∈ {1(stop), 2(continue)} (35)
where µ denotes a stationary policy. For each initial distribution pi0 ∈ Π(X) and policy
µ, the following cost is associated
Jµ(pi0) = E
µ
pi0
τ−1∑
k=1
ρk−1C(pik, uk = 2) + ρτ−1C(pik, uk = 1)
 (36)
11It is important to distinguish between the “local” decisions ak of the agents and “global” decisions uk of
the market observer. Clearly the decisions ak affect the choice of uk as will be made precise below.
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Figure 7: Sequential detection with risk-averse social sensors. Each social sensor re-
ceives a noisy observation on the state and chooses an action to minimize its CVaR
measure of trading. The social sensors communicate their actions to subsequent sen-
sors. The market observer seeks to determine if there is a change in the value of the
underlying asset from the actions of the sensors.
Here ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor which is a measure of the degree of impatience
of the market observer. (As long as f is non-zero, stopping is guaranteed in finite time
and so ρ = 1 is allowed.)
Given the cost, the market observer’s objective is to determine τ0 with minimum
cost by computing an optimal policy µ∗ such that
Jµ∗ (pi0) = inf
µ∈µJµ(pi0) (37)
The sequential detection problem (37) can be viewed as a partially observed Markov
decision process (POMDP) where the belief update is given by the social learning filter.
Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulation
The optimal policy of the market observer µ∗ : Π(X) → {1, 2} is the solution of (36)
and is given by Bellman’s dynamic programming equation as follows:
V(pi) = min
C(pi, 1),C(pi, 2) + ρ∑
a∈A
V(T pi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)
 (38)
µ∗(pi) = argmin
C(pi, 1),C(pi, 2) + ρ∑
a∈A
V(T pi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)

where T pi(pi, a) = R
pi
a P
′pi
1′Rpia P′pi
is the CVaR-social learning filter and σ(pi, a) = 1′RpiaP′pi is the
normalization factor of the Bayesian update. C(pi, 1) and C(pi, 2) from (33) and (34) are
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the market observer’s costs. As C(pi, 1) and C(pi, 2) are non-negative and bounded for
pi ∈ Π(X), the stopping time τ is finite for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
The aim of the market observer is then to determine the stopping set S = {pi ∈
Π(X) : µ∗(pi) = 1} given by:
S =
pi : C(pi, 1) < C(pi, 2) + ρ∑
a∈A
V(T pi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)

The dynamic programming equation (38) is similar to that for stopping time POMDP
except that the belief update is given by a CVaR social learning filter. As will be shown
below, because of the social learning dynamics, quite remarkably, S is not necessarily
a convex set. This is in stark contrast to classical quickest detection where the stopping
region is always convex irrespective of the change time distribution [104].
Social Learning Behavior of Risk Averse Agents
The following discussion highlights the relation between risk-aversion factor α and the
regions Pαl . For a given risk-aversion factor α, it can be shown that there are at most
Y + 1 polytopes on the belief space. It was shown in [105] that for the risk neutral
case with X = 2, and P = I (the value is a random variable) the intervals Pα1 and Pα3
correspond to the herding region and the interval Pα2 corresponds to the social learning
region. In the herding region, the agents take the same action as the belief is frozen. In
the social learning region there is observational learning. However, when the agents are
optimizing a more general risk measure (CVaR), the social learning region is different
for different risk-aversion factors. The social learning region for the CVaR risk measure
is shown in Fig. 8. It can be observed from Fig. 8 thatPα1 becomes smaller,Pα2 becomes
smaller and Pα3 becomes larger as α decreases. The following parameters were chosen:
B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, c =
[
1 2
3 0.5
]
This can be interpreted as risk-averse agents showing a larger tendency to go with the
crowd rather than “risk" choosing the other action. With the same B and c parameters,
but with transition matrix
P =
[
1 0
0.1 0.9
]
the social learning region is shown in Fig. 9. From Fig. 9, it is observed that when the
state is evolving and when the agents are sufficiently risk-averse, social learning region
is very small. It can be interpreted as: agents having a strong risk-averse attitude don’t
prefer to “learn" from the crowd; but rather face the same consequences, when P , I.
Nonconvex Stopping Set for Market Shock Detection
We now illustrate the solution to the Bellman’s stochastic dynamic programming equa-
tion (38), which determines the optimal policy for quickest market shock detection, by
considering an agent based model with two states. Clearly the agents (local decision
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Figure 8: The social learning region for the risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, 1]. It can
be seen that the curves corresponding to pi∗∗ and pi∗ do not intersect and their separation
(social learning region) varies with α. Here P = I, i.e, the value is a random variable.
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Figure 9: The social learning region for the risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, 1]. It can
be seen that the social learning region is absent when agents are sufficiently risk-averse
and is larger when the stock value is known to change, i.e, P , I.
makers) and market observer interact – the local decisions ak taken by the agents de-
termines the public belief pik and hence determines decision uk of the market observer
via (35).
Fig. 10 displays the value function and optimal policy for a toy example having the
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Figure 10: The value function V(pi) and the double threshold optimal policy µ∗(pi) are
plotted over pi(2). The significance of the double threshold policy is that the stopping
regions are non-convex. The implication of non-convex stopping set for the market
observer is that - if he believes that it is optimal to stop, it need not be optimal to stop
when his belief is larger.
following parameters:
B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0.06 0.94
]
, c =
[
1 2
2.5 0.5
]
The parameters for the market observer are chosen as: d = 1.25, f = [0 3], α = 0.8
and ρ = 0.9.
From Fig. 10 it is clear that the market observer has a double threshold policy and
the value function is discontinuous. The double threshold policy is unusual from a
signal processing point of view. Recall that pi(2) depicts the posterior probability of
no change. The market observer “changes its mind" - it switches from no change to
change as the posterior probability of change decreases! Thus the global decision (stop
or continue) is a non-monotone function of the posterior probability obtained from local
decisions in the agent based model. The example illustrates the unusual behaviour of
the social learning filter.
Summary
In this subsection we provided a Bayesian formulation of the problem of quickest de-
tection of change in the value of a stock using the decisions of socially aware risk
averse agents. The quickest detection problem was shown to be non-trivial - the stop-
ping region is in general non-convex when the agents’ risk attitude was accounted for
by considering a coherent risk measure, CVaR. Results which characterize the struc-
tural properties of social learning under the CVaR risk measure were provided and the
importance of these results in understanding the global behaviour was discussed. It was
observed that the behaviour of these risk-averse agents is, as expected, different from
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risk neutral agents. Risk averse agents herd sooner and do not prefer to “learn" from
the crowd, i.e, social learning region is smaller the more risk-averse the agents are. For
further structural results on the risk averse social learning filter, please see [107].
3.3 Data Incest in Online Reputation Systems
In comparison to the previous subsections , where social learning model was formu-
lated on a line graph, we now consider social learning on a family of time dependent
directed acyclic graphs - in such cases, apart from herding, the phenomenon of data
incest arises.
Consider an online reputation system comprised of agents {1, 2, . . . , S } that aim to
estimate an underlying state of nature (a random variable). Let x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X}
represent the state of nature (such as the quality of a restaurant/hotel) with known
prior distribution pi0. Let k = 1, 2, 3, . . . depict epochs at which events occur. These
events involve taking observations, evaluating beliefs and choosing actions as described
below. The index k marks the historical order of events. For simplicity, we refer to k as
“time".
It is convenient also to reduce the coordinates of time k and agent s to a single
integer index n:
n , s + S (k − 1), s ∈ {1, . . . , S }, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . (39)
We refer to n as a “node" of a time dependent information flow graph Gn which we
now define. Let
Gn = (Vn, En), n = 1, 2, . . . (40)
denote a sequence of time-dependent directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) 12 of information
flow in the social network until and including time k where n = s+S (k−1). Each vertex
in Vn represents an agent s′ in the social network at time k′ and each edge (n′, n′′) in
En ⊆ Vn×Vn shows that the information (action) of node n′ (agent s′ at time k′) reaches
node n′′ (agent s′′ at time k′′). It is clear that Gn is a sub-graph of Gn+1.
The Adjacency Matrix An of Gn is an n × n matrix with elements An(i, j) given by
An(i, j) =
1 if (v j, vi) ∈ E ,0 otherwise , An(i, i) = 0. (41)
The transitive closure matrix Tn is the n × n matrix
Tn = sgn((In − An)−1) (42)
where for matrix M, the matrix sgn(M) has elements
sgn(M)(i, j) =
0 if M(i, j) = 0 ,1 if M(i, j) , 0.
Note that An(i, j) = 1 if there is a single hop path between nodes i and j, In comparison,
Tn(i, j) = 1 if there exists a path (possible multi-hop) between i and j.
12A DAG is a directed graph with no directed cycles.
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The information reaching node n depends on the information flow graph Gn. The
following two sets will be used to specify the incest removal algorithms below:
Hn = {m : An(m, n) = 1} (43)
Fn = {m : Tn(m, n) = 1}. (44)
ThusHn denotes the set of previous nodes m that communicate with node n in a single-
hop. In comparison, Fn denotes the set of previous nodes m whose information even-
tually arrives at node n. Thus Fn contains all possible multi-hop connections by which
information from a node m eventually reaches node n.
Example
Consider S = 2 two agents with information flow graph for three time points k = 1, 2, 3
depicted in Fig.11 characterized by the family of DAGs {G1, . . . ,G7}. The adjacency
matrices A1, . . . , A7 are constructed as follows: An is the upper left n × n submatrix of
An+1 and
A7 =

0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Figure 11: Example of information flow network with S = 2 two agents, namely
s ∈ {1, 2} and time points k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Circles represent the nodes indexed by n =
s + S (k−1) in the social network and each edge depicts a communication link between
two nodes.
Let us explain these matrices. Since nodes 1 and 2 do not communicate, clearly
A1 and A2 are zero matrices. Nodes 1 and 3 communicate, hence A3 has a single one,
etc. Note that if nodes 1,3,4 and 7 are assumed to be the same individual, then at
node 7, the individual remembers what happened at node 5 and node 1, but not node
3. This models the case where the individual has selective memory and remembers
certain highlights. From (43) and (44),
H7 = {1, 5, 6}, F7 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
where H7 denotes all one hop links to node 7 while F7 denotes all multihop links to
node 7.
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3.4 Data Incest Model and Social Influence Constraint
Each node n receives recommendations from its immediate friends (one hop neighbors)
according to the information flow graph defined above. That is, it receives actions
{am,m ∈ Hn} from nodes m ∈ Hn and then seeks to compute the associated public
beliefs pim,m ∈ Hn. If node n naively (incorrectly) assumes that the public beliefs
pim,m ∈ Hn are independent, then it would fuse these as
pin− =
∏
m∈Hn pim
1′X
∏
m∈Hn pim
. (WRONG!) (45)
This naive data fusion would result in data incest.
3.4.1 Aim
The aim is to provide each node n the true posterior distribution
pi0n−(i) = P(x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}) (46)
subject to the following social influence constraint: There exists a fusion algorithmA
such that
pi0n− = A(pim,m ∈ Hn). (47)
3.4.2 Discussion. Fair Rating and Social Influence
We briefly pause to discuss (46) and (47).
(i) We call pi0n− in (46) the true or fair online rating available to node n since Fn defined
in (44) denotes all information (multi-hop links) available to node n. By definition pi0n−
is incest free and is the desired conditional probability that agent n needs.
Indeed, if node n combines pi0n− together with its own private observation via social
learning, then clearly
ηn(i) = P(x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, yn), i ∈ X,
pin(i) = P(x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, an), i ∈ X,
are, respectively, the correct (incest free) private belief for node n and the correct after-
action public belief. If agent n does not use pi0n−, then incest can propagate; for example
if agent n naively uses (45).
Why should an individual n agree to use pi0n− to combine with its private message?
It is here that the social influence constraint (47) is important. Hn can be viewed as
the “social message”, i.e., personal friends of node n since they directly communicate
to node n, while the associated beliefs can be viewed as the “informational message”.
As described in the remarkable recent paper [28], the social message from personal
friends exerts a large social influence13 – it provides significant incentive (peer pres-
sure) for individual n to comply with the protocol of combining its estimate with pi0n−
13In a study conducted by social networking site myYearbook, 81% of respondents said they had received
advice from friends and followers relating to a product purchase through a social site; 74 percent of those
who received such advice found it to be influential in their decision. (Click Z, January 2010).
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and thereby prevent incest. [28] shows that receiving messages from known friends
has significantly more influence on an individual than the information in the messages.
This study includes a comparison of information messages and social messages on
Facebook and their direct effect on voting behavior. To quote [28], “The effect of so-
cial transmission on real-world voting was greater than the direct effect of the messages
themselves..." In Sec.3.7, we provide results of an experiment on human subjects that
also illustrates social influence in social learning. [99] is an influential paper in the area
of social influence.
3.5 Incest Removal in Online Reputation System
It is convenient to work with the logarithm of the un-normalized belief14; accordingly
define
ln(i) ∝ log pin(i), ln−(i) ∝ log pin−(i), i ∈ X.
The following theorem shows that the logarithm of the fair rating pi0n− defined in
(46) can be obtained as a weighted linear combination of the logarithms of previous
public beliefs.
Theorem 3.3 (Fair Rating Algorithm). Suppose the network administrator runs the
following algorithm for an online reputation system:
ln−(i) = w′n l1:n−1(i)
where wn = T−1n−1tn. (48)
Then ln−(i) ∝ log pi0n−(i). That is, the fair rating log pi0n−(i) defined in (46) is obtained.
In (48), wn is an n − 1 dimensional weight vector. Recall that tn denotes the first n − 1
elements of the nth column of the transitive closure matrix Tn. 
Theorem 3.3 says that the fair rating pi0n− can be expressed as a linear function of
the action log-likelihoods in terms of the transitive closure matrix Tn of graph Gn. This
is intuitive since pi0n− can be viewed as the sum of information collected by the nodes
such that there are paths between all these nodes and n.
Theorem 3.4 (Achievability of Fair Rating). Consider the fair rating algorithm spec-
ified by (48). With available information (pim,m ∈ Hn) to achieve the estimates ln− of
algorithm (48), a necessary and sufficient condition on the information flow graph Gn
is
An( j, n) = 0 =⇒ wn( j) = 0. (49)
(Recall wn is specified in (48).) 
Note that the constraint (49) is purely in terms of the adjacency matrix An, since
the transitive closure matrix (42) is a function of the adjacency matrix.
14The un-normalized belief proportional to pin(i) is the numerator of the social learning filter (21). The
corresponding un-normalized fair rating corresponding to pi0n−(i) is the joint distribution P(x = i, {am,m ∈
Fn}). By taking the logarithm of the un-normalized belief, Bayes formula merely becomes the sum of
the log likelihood and log prior. This allows us to devise a data incest removal algorithm based on linear
combinations of the log beliefs.
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3.6 Ordinal Decisions and Bayesian Social Sensors
The social learning protocol assumes that each agent is a Bayesian utility optimizer.
The following discussion puts together ideas from the economics literature to show that
under reasonable conditions, such a Bayesian model is a useful idealization of agents’
behaviors. This means that the Bayesian social learning follows simple intuitive rules
and is therefore, a useful idealization. (In Sec.4, we discuss the theory of revealed
preferences which yields a non-parametric test on data to determine if an agent is a
utility maximizer.)
Humans typically make monotone decisions - the more favorable the private ob-
servation, the higher the recommendation. Humans make ordinal decisions15 since
humans tend to think in symbolic ordinal terms. Under what conditions is the recom-
mendation an made by node n monotone increasing in its observation yn and ordinal?
Recall from the social learning protocol (20) that the actions of agents are
ak = arg min
a∈A {c
′
aBykpik}.
So an equivalent question is: Under what conditions is the argmin increasing in obser-
vation yn? Note that an increasing argmin is an ordinal property - that is, argmina c
′
aBynpi
0
n−
increasing in y implies argmina φ(c
′
aBynpi
0
n−) is also increasing in y for any monotone
function φ(·).
The following result gives sufficient conditions for each agent to give a recommen-
dation that is monotone and ordinal in its private observation:
Theorem 3.5. Suppose the observation probabilities and costs satisfy the following
conditions:
(A1) Biy are TP2 (totally positive of order 2); that is, Bi+1,yBi,y+1 ≤ Bi,yBi+1,y+1.
(A2) c(x, a) is submodular. That is, c(x, a + 1) − c(x, a) ≤ c(x + 1, a + 1) − c(x + 1, a).
Then
1. Under (A1) and (A2), the recommendation an(pi0n−, yn) made by agent n is in-
creasing and hence ordinal in observation yn, for any pi0n−.
2. Under (A2), an(pi0n−, yn) is increasing in belief pi0n− with respect to the monotone
likelihood ratio (MLR) stochastic order16 for any observation yn. 
The proof is in [105]. We can interpret the above theorem as follows. If agents
makes recommendations that are monotone and ordinal in the observations and mono-
tone in the prior, then they mimic the Bayesian social learning model. Even if the
agent does not exactly follow a Bayesian social learning model, its monotone ordinal
behavior implies that such a Bayesian model is a useful idealization.
Condition (A1) is widely studied in monotone decision making; see the classical
book by Karlin [97] and [98]; numerous examples of noise distributions are TP2. In-
deed in the highly cited paper [136] in the economics literature, observation y + 1 is
said to be more “favorable news” than observation y if Condition (A1) holds.
15Humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal scales before making decisions. For example,
it does not matter if the cost of a meal at a restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual would classify this cost
as “high". Also credit rating agencies use ordinal symbols such as AAA, AA, A.
16 Given probability mass functions {pi} and {qi}, i = 1, . . . , X then p MLR dominates q if log pi −
log pi+1 ≤ log qi − log qi+1.
39
Condition (A2) is the well known submodularity condition [171, 137, 10]. (A2)
makes sense in a reputation system for the costs to be well posed. Suppose the recom-
mendations in action setA are arranged in increasing order and also the states in X for
the underlying state are arranged in ascending order. Then (A2) says: if recommenda-
tion a + 1 is more accurate than recommendation a for state x; then recommendation
a + 1 is also more accurate than recommendation a for state x + 1 (which is a higher
quality state than x).
In the experiment results reported in Sec.3.7, we found that (A1) and (A2) of The-
orem 3.5 are justified.
3.7 Psychology Experiment Dataset
To illustrate social learning, data incest and social influence, this section presents an
actual psychology experiment that was conducted by our colleagues at the Department
of Psychology of University of British Columbia in September and October, 2013. The
participants comprised 36 undergraduate students who participated in the experiment
for course credit.
3.7.1 Experiment Setup
The experimental study involved 1658 individual trials. Each trial comprised two par-
ticipants who were asked to perform a perceptual task interactively. The perceptual
task was as follows: Two arrays of circles denoted left and right, were given to each
pair of participants. Each participant was asked to judge which array (left or right) had
the larger average diameter. The participants answer (left of right) constituted their
action. So the action space isA = {0 (left), 1 (right)}.
The circles were prepared for each trial as follows: two 4 × 4 grids of circles were
generated by uniformly sampling from the radii: {20, 24, 29, 35, 42} (in pixels). The
average diameter of each grid was computed, and if the means differed by more than
8% or less than 4%, new grids were made. Thus in each trial, the left array and right
array of circles differed in the average diameter by 4-8%
For each trial, one of the two participants was chosen randomly to start the experi-
ment by choosing an action according to his/her observation. Thereafter, each partici-
pant was given access to their partner’s previous response (action) and the participants
own previous action prior to making his/her judgement. This mimics the social learn-
ing protocol. The participants continued choosing actions according to this procedure
until the experiment terminated. The trial terminated when the response of each of the
two participants did not change for three successive iterations (the two participants did
not necessarily have to agree for the trial to terminate).
In each trial, the actions of participants were recorded along with the time interval
taken to choose their action. As an example, Fig. 13 illustrates the sample path of
decisions made by the two participants in one of the 1658 trials. In this specific trial,
the average diameter of the left array of circles was 32.1875 and the right array was
30.5625 (in pixels); so the ground truth was 0 (left).
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Figure 12: Two arrays of circles were given to each pair of participants on a screen.
Their task is to interactively determine which side (either left or right) had the larger
average diameter. The partner’s previous decision was displayed on screen prior to the
stimulus.
3.7.2 Experimental Results
The results of our experimental study are as follows:
Social learning Model As mentioned above, the experiment for each pair of partici-
pants was continued until both participants’ responses stabilized. In what percentage of
these experiments, did an agreement occur between the two participants? The answer
to this question reveals whether “herding" occurred in the experiments and whether the
participants performed social learning (influenced by their partners). The experiments
show that in 66% of trials (1102 among 1658), participants reached an agreement; that
is herding occurred. Further, in 32% of the trials, both participants converged to the
correct decision after a few interactions.
To construct a social learning model for the experimental data, we consider the
experiments where both participants reached an agreement. Define the social learning
success rate as
# expts where both participants chose correct answer
# expts where both participants reached an agreement
·
In the experimental study, the state space is X = {0, 1} where x = 0, when the left
array of circles has the larger diameter and x = 1, when the right array has the larger
diameter. The initial belief for both participants is considered to be pi0 = [0.5, 0.5]. The
observation space is assumed to be Y = {0, 1}.
To estimate the social learning model parameters (observation probabilities Biy and
costs c(i, a)), we determined the parameters that best fit the learning success rate of the
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Figure 13: Example of sample path of actions chosen by two participants in a single
trial of the experiment. In this trial, both participants eventually chose the correct
answer 0 (left).
experimental data. The best fit parameters obtained were17
Biy =
[
0.61 0.39
0.41 0.59
]
, c(i, a) =
[
0 2
2 0
]
.
Note that Biy and c(i, a) satisfy both the conditions of the Theorem 3.5, namely TP2
observation probabilities and single-crossing cost. This implies that the subjects of this
experiment made monotone and ordinal decisions.
Data incest Here, we study the effect of information patterns in the experimental
study that can result in data incest. Since private observations are highly subjective
and participants did not document these, we cannot claim with certainty if data incest
changed the action of an individual. However, from the experimental data, we can lo-
calize specific information patterns that can result in incest. In particular, we focus on
the two information flow graphs depicted in Fig.14. In the two graphs of Fig.14, the
action of the first participant at time k influenced the action of the second participant
at time k + 1, and thus, could have been double counted by the first participant at time
k + 2. We found that in 79% of experiments, one of the information patterns shown
in Fig.14 occurred (1303 out of 1658 experiments). Further, in 21% of experiments,
the information patterns shown in Fig.14 occurred and at least one participant changed
his/her decision, i.e., the judgement of participant at time k + 1 differed from his/her
judgements at time k + 2 and k. These results show that even for experiments involving
two participants, data incest information patterns occur frequently (79%) and causes in-
17Parameter estimation in social learning is a challenging problem not addressed in this chapter. Due to
the formation of cascades in finite time, construction of an asymptotically consistent estimator is impossible,
since actions after the formation of a cascade contain no information.
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dividuals to modify their actions (21%). It shows that social learning protocols require
careful design to handle and mitigate data incest.
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Attempt 
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Attempt 
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K+2
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action: 1
action: 1
action: 1
action: 0/1
action: 0/1 action: 0/1
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action: 0
action: 0
action: 0
action: 0/1
action: 0/1 action: 0/1
Figure 14: Two information patterns from our experimental studies which can result
in data incest.
3.8 Summary and Extensions
In this section, we have outlined a controlled sensing problem over a social network
in which the administrator controls (removes) data incest and thereby maintains an
unbiased (fair) online reputation system. The state of nature could be geographical
coordinates of an event (in a target localization problem) or quality of a social unit (in
an online reputation system). As discussed above, data incest arises due to the recursive
nature of Bayesian estimation and non-determinism in the timing of the sensing by
individuals. Details of proofs, extensions and further numerical studies are presented
in [110, 77].
We summarize some extensions of the social learning framework that are relevant
to interactive sensing.
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3.8.1 Wisdom of Crowds
Surowiecki’s book [168] is an excellent popular piece that explains the wisdom-of-
crowds hypothesis. The wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis predicts that the independent
judgments of a crowd of individuals (as measured by any form of central tendency)
will be relatively accurate, even when most of the individuals in the crowd are ignorant
and error prone. The book also studies situations (such as rational bubbles) in which
crowds are not wiser than individuals. Collect enough people on a street corner staring
at the sky, and everyone who walks past will look up. Such herding behavior is typical
in social learning.
3.8.2 In which order should agents act?
In the social learning protocol, we assumed that the agents act sequentially in a pre-
defined order. However, in many social networking applications, it is important to opti-
mize the order in which agents act. For example, consider an online review site where
individual reviewers with different reputations make their reviews publicly available.
If a reviewer with high reputation publishes her review first, this review will unduly af-
fect the decision of a reviewer with lower reputation. In other words, if the most senior
agent “speaks" first it would unduly affect the decisions of more junior agents. This
could lead to an increase in bias of the underlying state estimate.18 On the other hand,
if the most junior agent is polled first, then since its variance is large, several agents
would need to be polled in order to reduce the variance. We refer the reader to [148]
for an interesting description of who should speak first in a public debate.19 It turns out
that for two agents, the seniority rule is always optimal for any prior – that is, the senior
agent speaks first followed by the junior agent; see [148] for the proof. However, for
more than two agents, the optimal order depends on the prior, and the observations in
general.
4 Revealed Preferences: Are social sensors utility max-
imizers?
We now move on to the third main topic of the chapter, namely, the principle of revealed
preferences. The main question addressed is: Given a dataset of decisions made by a
social sensor, is it possible to determine if the social sensor is a utility maximizer?
More generally, is a dataset from a multiagent system consistent with play from a Nash
equilibrium? If yes, can the behavior of the social sensors be learned using data from
the social network?
18To quote [11]: “In 94% of cases, groups (of people) used the first answer provided as their final an-
swer... Groups tended to commit to the first answer provided by any group member.” People with dominant
personalities tend to speak first and most forcefully “even when they actually lack competence”.
19As described in [148], seniority is considered in the rules of debate and voting in the U.S. Supreme
Court. “In the past, a vote was taken after the newest justice to the Court spoke, with the justices voting in
order of ascending seniority largely, it was said, to avoid the pressure from long-term members of the Court
on their junior colleagues."
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These questions are fundamentally different to the model-based theme that is widely
used in the signal processing literature in which an objective function (typically convex)
is proposed and then algorithms are constructed to compute the minimum. In contrast,
the revealed preference approach is data-centric–we wish to determine whether the
dataset is obtained from an utility maximizer. In simple terms, revealed preference the-
ory seeks to determine if an agent is an utility maximizer subject to budget constraints
based on observing its choices over time. In signal processing terminology, such prob-
lems can be viewed as set-valued system identification of an argmax nonlinear system.
The principle of revealed preferences is widely studied in the micro-economics litera-
ture. As mentioned in Sec.1, Varian has written several influential papers in this area.
In this section we will use the principle of revealed preferences on datasets to determine
how social sensors behave as a function of external influence. The setup is depicted in
the schematic diagram Fig.15.
4.1 Afriat’s Theorem for a single agent
The theory of revealed preferences was pioneered by Samuelson [163]. Afriat pub-
lished a highly influential paper [7] in revealed preferences (see also [8]). Given a
time-series of data D = {(pt, xt), t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }} where pt ∈ Rm denotes the external
influence, xt denotes the response of agent, and t denotes the time index, is it possible
to detect if the agent is a utility maximizer? An agent is a utility maximizer if for every
external influence pt, the chosen response xt satisfies
xt(pt) ∈ arg max
{p′t x≤It}
u(x) (50)
with u(x) a non-satiated utility function. Nonsatiated means that an increase in any
element of response x results in the utility function increasing.20 As shown by Diew-
ert [54], without local nonsatiation the maximization problem (50) may have no solu-
tion.
In (50) the budget constraint p′t x ≤ It denotes the total amount of resources avail-
able to the social sensor for selecting the response x to the external influence pt. For
example, if pt is the electricity price and xt the associated electricity consumption, then
the budget of the social sensor is the available monetary funds for purchasing electric-
ity. In the real-world social sensor datasets provided in this chapter, further insights are
provided for the budget constraint.
The celebrated “Afriat’s theorem" provides a necessary and sufficient condition for
a finite dataset D to have originated from an utility maximizer. Afriat’s theorem has
subsequently been expanded and refined, most notably by Diewert [54], Varian [175]
and Blundell [26].
Theorem 4.1 (Afriat’s Theorem). Given a datasetD = {(pt, xt) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }}, the
following statements are equivalent:
1. The agent is a utility maximizer and there exists a nonsatiated and concave utility
function that satisfies (50).
20The non-satiated assumption rules out trivial cases such as a constant utility function which can be
optimized by any response.
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2. For scalars ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities has a feasible solution:
uτ − ut − λt p′t(xτ − xt) ≤ 0 for t, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. (51)
3. A nonsatiated and concave utility function that satisfies (50) is given by:
u(x) = min
t∈T {ut + λt p
′
t(x − xt)} (52)
4. The dataset D satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP),
namely for any k ≤ T, p′t xt ≥ p′t xt+1 ∀t ≤ k − 1 =⇒ p′k xk ≤ p′k x1. 
As pointed out in [175], a remarkable feature of Afriat’s theorem is that if the
dataset can be rationalized by a non-trivial utility function, then it can be rationalized
by a continuous, concave, monotonic utility function. “Put another way, violations of
continuity, concavity, or monotonicity cannot be detected with only a finite number of
demand observations".
Verifying GARP (statement 4 of Theorem 4.1) on a datasetD comprising T points
can be done using Warshall’s algorithm with O(T 3) [175, 62] computations. Alterna-
tively, determining if Afriat’s inequalities (51) are feasible can be done via a LP feasi-
bility test (using for example interior point methods [31]). Note that the utility (52) is
not unique and is ordinal by construction. Ordinal means that any monotone increas-
ing transformation of the utility function will also satisfy Afriat’s theorem. Therefore
the utility mimics the ordinal behavior of humans, see also Sec.3.6. Geometrically the
estimated utility (52) is the lower envelop of a finite number of hyperplanes that is
consistent with the datasetD.
Note that GARP is equivalent to the notion of “cyclical consistency” [176] – they
state that the responses are consistent with utility maximization if no negative cycles are
present. As an example, consider a dataset D with T = 2 observations resulting from
a utility maximization agent. Then GARP states that p′1x1 ≥ p′1x2 =⇒ p′2x2 ≤ p′2x1.
From (50), the underlying utility function must satisfy u(x1) ≥ u(x2) =⇒ u(x2) ≤
u(x1) where the equality results if x1 = x2.
Another remarkable feature of Afriat’s Theorem is that no parametric assumptions
of the utility function of the agent are necessary. To gain insight into the construction
of the inequalities (51), let us assume the utility function u(x) in (50) is increasing for
positive x, concave, and differentiable. If xt solves the maximization problem (50), then
from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions there must exist Lagrange multipliers
λt such that
∇u(xt) = λt∇(p′t xt − It) = λt pt
is satisfied for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. Note that since u(x) is increasing, ∇u(xt) = λt pt > 0,
and since pt is strictly positive, λt > 0. Given that u(x) is a concave differentiable
function, it follows that
u(x) ≤ u(xt) + ∇u(xt)′(x − xt) ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }.
Denoting ut = u(xt) and uτ = u(xτ), and using the KKT conditions and concave dif-
ferential property, the inequalities (51) result. To prove that if the solution of (51) is
feasible then GARP is satisfied can be performed using the duality theorem of linear
programming as illustrated in [62].
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4.2 Revealed Preferences for Multi-agent Social Sensors
We now consider a multi-agent version of Afriat’s theorem for deciding if a dataset
is generated by playing from the equilibrium of a potential game21 An example is the
control of power consumption in the electrical grid. Consider a corporate network of
financial management operators that select the electricity prices in a set of zones in
the power grid. By selecting the prices of electricity the operators are expected to be
able to control the power consumption in each zone. The operators wish to supply
their consumers with sufficient power however given the finite amount of resources
the operators in the corporate network must interact. This behavior can be modelled
as a game. Recent analysis of energy use scheduling and demand side management
schemes in the energy market have been performed using potential games [38, 91, 184].
Another example of potential games are congestion games [160, 81, 17, 135] in which
the utility of each player depends on the amount of resource it and other players use.
Consider the social network presented in Fig.15, given a time-series of data from
N agents D = {(pt, x1t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }} with pt ∈ Rm the external influence,
xit the response of agent i, and t the time index, is it possible to detect if the dataset
originated from agents that play a potential game?
The characterization of how agents behave as a function of external influence, for
example price of using a resource, and the responses of other agents in a social network,
is key for analysis. Consider the social network illustrated in Fig.15. There are a total
of n interacting agents in the network and each can produce a response xit in response to
the other agents and an external influence pt. Without any a priori assumptions about
the agents, how can the behaviour of the agents in the social network be learned? In the
engineering literature the behaviour of agents is typically defined a priori using a utility
function, however our focus here is on learning the behaviour of agents. The utility
function captures the satisfaction or payoff an agent receives from a set of possible
responses, denoted by X. Formally, a utility function u : X → R represents a preference
relation between responses x1 and x2 if and only if for every x1, x2 ∈ X, u(x1) ≤ u(x2)
implies x2 is preferred to x1. Given a time-series of data D = {(pt, x1t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,T }} with pt ∈ Rm the external influence, xit the response of agent i, and t the
time index, is it possible to detect if the series originated from an agent that is a utility
maximizer?
In a network of social sensors (Fig.15), the responses of agents may be dependent
on both the external influence pt and the responses of the other agents in the network,
denoted by x−it . The utility function of the agent must now include the responses of
other agents–formally if there are n agents, each has a utility function ui(xi, x−it ) with
xi denoting the response of agent i, x−it the responses of the other n − 1 agents, and
ui(·) the utility of agent i. Given a dataset D, is it possible to detect if the data is
consistent with agents playing a game and maximizing their individual utilities? Deb,
following Varian’s and Afriat’s work, shows that refutable restrictions exist for the
datasetD, given by (53), to satisfy Nash equilibrium (54) [51, 7, 178]. These refutable
restrictions are however, satisfied by most D [51]. The detection of agents engaged
in a concave potential game, and generating responses that satisfy Nash equilibrium,
21As in [51], we consider potential games since they are sufficiently specialized so that there exist datasets
that fail Afriat’s test.
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Figure 15: Schematic of a social network containing n agents where pt ∈ Rm denotes
the external influence, and xit ∈ Rm the response of agent i in response to the external
influence and other agents at time t. Note that dotted line denotes consumers 4, . . . , n−
1. The aim is to determine if the datasetD defined in (53), is consistent with play from
a Nash equilibrium.
provide stronger restrictions on the dataset D [51, 52]. We denote this behaviour as
Nash rationality, defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 ([52, 174, 145]). Given a dataset
D = {(pt, x1t , x2t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }}, (53)
D is consistent with Nash equilibrium play if there exist utility functions ui(xi, x−i) such
that
xit = x
i∗
t (pt) ∈ arg max
{p′t xi≤Iit }
ui(xi, x−i). (54)
In (54), ui(x, x−i) is a nonsatiated utility function in x, x−i = {x j} j,i for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and the elements of pt are strictly positive. Nonsatiated means that for any  > 0, there
exists a xi with ‖xi − xit‖2 <  such that ui(xi, x−i) > ui(xit, x−it ). If for all xi, x j ∈ Xi,
there exists a concave potential function V that satisfies
ui(xi, x−i) − ui(x j, x−i) > 0 iff V(xi, x−i) − V(x j, x−i) > 0 (55)
for all the utility functions ui(·) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then the dataset D satisfies Nash
rationality. 
Just as with the utility maximization budget constraint in (50), the budget constraint
p′t xi ≤ Iit in (54) models the total amount of resources available to the social sensor for
selecting the response xit to the external influence pt.
The detection test for Nash rationality (Definition 4.2) has been used in [35] to
detect if oil producing countries are collusive, and in [51] for the analysis of household
consumption behaviour.
In the following sections, decision tests for utility maximization, and a non-parametric
learning algorithm for predicting agent responses are presented. Three real world
datasets are analyzed using the non-parametric decision tests and learning algorithm.
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The datasets are comprised of bidders auctioning behaviour, electrical consumption in
the power grid, and on the tweeting dynamics of agents in the social network Twitter
illustrated in Fig.15.
4.3 Decision Test for Nash Rationality
This section presents a non-parametric test for Nash rationality given the dataset D
defined in (53). If the datasetD passes the test, then it is consistent with play according
to a Nash equilibrium of a concave potential game. In Sec.4.4, a learning algorithm
is provided that can be used to predict the response of agents in the social network
provided in Fig.15.
The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset
D to be consistent with Nash rationality (Definition 4.2). The proof is analogous to
Afriat’s Theorem when the concave potential function of the game is differentiable [51,
52, 89].
Theorem 4.3 (Multiagent Afriat’s Theorem). Given a dataset D (53), the following
statements are equivalent:
1. D is consistent with Nash rationality (Definition 4.2) for an n-player concave
potential game.
2. Given scalars vt and λit > 0 the following set of inequalities have a feasible
solution for t, τ ∈ {1, . . . ,T },
vτ − vt −
n∑
i=1
λit p
′
t(x
i
τ − xit) ≤ 0. (56)
3. A concave potential function that satisfies (54) is given by:
Vˆ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = min
t∈T {vt +
n∑
i=1
λit p
′
t(x
i − xit)}. (57)
4. The dataset D satisfies the Potential Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(PGARP) if the following two conditions are satisfied.
(a) For every dataset Diτ = {(pt, xit) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
all τ ∈ {1, . . . ,T },Diτ satisfies GARP.
(b) The responses xit originated from players in a concave potential game. 
Note that if only a single agent (i.e. n = 1) is considered, then Theorem 4.3 is
identical to Afriat’s Theorem. Similar to Afriat’s Theorem, the constructed concave
potential function (57) is ordinal–that is, unique up to positive monotone transforma-
tions. Therefore several possible options for Vˆ(·) exist that would produce identical
preference relations to the actual potential function V(·). In 4) of Theorem 4.3, the first
condition only provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the datasetD to be con-
sistent with a Nash equilibrium of a game, therefore the second condition is required to
ensure consistency with the other statements in the Multiagent Afriat’s Theorem. The
intuition that connects statements 1 and 3 in Theorem 4.3 is provided by the follow-
ing result from [145]; for any smooth potential game that admits a concave potential
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function V , a sequence of responses {xi}i∈{1,2,...,n} are generated by a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a maximizer of the potential function,
xt = {x1t , x2t , . . . , xnt } ∈ arg max V({xi}i∈{1,2,...,n})
s.t. p′t x
i ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (58)
for each probe vector pt ∈ Rm+ .
The non-parametric test for Nash rationality involves determining if (56) has a fea-
sible solution. Computing parameters vt and λit > 0 in (56) involves solving a linear
program with T 2 linear constraints in (n + 1)T variables, which has polynomial time
complexity [31]. In the special case of one agent, the constraint set in (56) is the dual
of the shortest path problem in network flows. Using the graph theoretic algorithm
presented in [20], the solution of the parameters ut and λt in (51) can be computed with
time complexity O(T 3).
4.4 Learning Algorithm for Response Prediction
In the previous section a non-parametric tests to detect if a datasetD is consistent with
Nash rationality was provided. If the D satisfies Nash rationality, then the Multiagent
Afriat’s Theorem can be used to construct the concave potential function of the game
for agents in the social network illustrated in Fig.15. In this section we provide a non-
parametric learning algorithm that can be used to predict the responses of agents using
the constructed concave potential function (57).
To predict the response of agent i, denoted by xˆiτ, for probe pτ and budget I
i
τ, the
optimization problem (58) is solved using the estimated potential function Vˆ (57), pτ,
and Iiτ. Computing xˆ
i
τ requires solving an optimization problem with linear constraints
and concave piecewise linear objective. This can be solved using the interior point
algorithm [31]. The algorithm used to predict the response xˆτ = (xˆ1τ, xˆ
2
τ, · · · , xˆnτ) is
given below:
Step 1: Select a probe vector pτ ∈ Rm+ , and response budget Iiτ for the estimation of
optimal response xˆτ ∈ Rm×n+ .
Step 2: For datasetD, compute the parameters vt and λit using (56).
Step 3: The response xˆτ is computed by solving the following linear program given
{D, pτ, Iiτ}, and {vt, λit} from Step 2:
max z
s.t. z ≤ vt +
n∑
i=1
λit p
′
t(xˆ
i
τ − xit) for t = 1, . . . ,T
p′τ xˆiτ ≤ Iiτ ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(59)
4.5 Dataset 1: Online Multiwinner Auction
This section illustrates how Afriat’s Theorem from Sec.4.1 can be used to determine
if bidders in an online multiwinner auction are utility optimizers. Online auctions are
rapidly gaining popularity since bidders do not have to gather at the same geographical
location. Several researchers have focused on the timing of bids and multiple bidding
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behavior in Amazon and eBay auctions [30, 147, 155, 53]. The analysis of the bidding
behavior can be exploited by auctioneers to target suitable bidders and thereby increase
profits.
The multiwinner auction dataset was obtained from an experimental study con-
ducted amongst undergraduate students in Electrical Engineering at Princeton Univer-
sity in March 25th 201122. The multiwinner auction consists of bidders competing for
questions that will aid them for an upcoming midterm exam. The social network is
composed of n = 12 bidders where the bidders do not interact with other bidders, they
only interact with the external influence, refer to Fig.15. Each bidder is endowed with
500 tokens prior to starting the multiwinner auction. The number of questions being
auctioned is not known to the bidders, this prevents the bidders from immediately sub-
mitting their entire budget in the final auction. Each auction consists of auctioning a
single question at an initial price of 10 tokens and has a duration of 30 min. At the be-
ginning of each auction the bidders are provided with the number of winners, denoted
k, that auction will have, and the budget of each bidder. The bids are private informa-
tion with each bidder only informed when their bid has been outbid. The bidders do
not communicate with each other during the auction. At the end of each auction, the
first k highest bidders are selected, denoted by ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζk. The bidders ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζk
are awarded with the question, and pay the second largest bid amount (i.e. bidder ζk
pays ζk−1’s bid amount). In the multiwinner auction it is in the self interest of bidders to
force other bidders to spend too much eliminating them from competing in successive
auctions.
If the bidding behaviour of agents satisfies Afriat’s test (51) for utility maximiza-
tion, the next goal is to classify the behaviour of bidders into two categories: strategic
and frantic. If a bidder fails Afriat’s test then they are classified as irrational. Strategic
bidders will typically submit a large number of bids and a smaller bid amount when
compared to frantic bidders. With this bidding behaviour, strategic bidders force the
other bidders to spend too much eliminating them from competing in future auctions.
Frantic bidders are however only interested in winning the current auction.
To apply Afriat’s test (51), the external influence pt, and bidder responses xt must
be defined. The external influence for each bidder is defined by pit = [p
i
t(1), p
i
t(2)]
with pit(1) = initial bid amount representing the bidders interest level for winning,
and pit(2) = # of winners representing the perception of winning where i is the bidder
and t the auction. Two datasets are considered for analysis denoted by D1 and D2.
An identical external influence is used to construct both D1 and D2. The responses
in D1 are given by xit = [xit(1), xit(2)] where xit(1) = # of bids and xit(2) = mean bid
amount; and for D2 the inputs of xit are given by xit(1) = # of bids and xit(2) = mean
change in bid amount. The response xit(2) inD1 provides the expected bid amount, and
xit(2) in D2 a measure of the statistical dispersion of the bids. The budget Iit of each
bidder has units of tokens multiplied by # of bids, and is constrained as the number of
tokens and auction duration are finite. The datasets D1 and D2 are constructed from
T = 6 auctions. The non-parametric test (51) is applied to each dataset D1 and D2
to detect irrational bidders. For dataset D1 bidder 4 is irrational, and for D2 bidder
11 is irrational. Note that the classification of irrational behaviour is dependent on the
22The experimental data is provided by Leberknight et al. [118].
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choice of response signals used for analysis by the experimentalist.
For utility maximization bidders, an estimate of the utility function of each bidder
is required to classify them as strategic or frantic. To estimate the utility function of
the bidders, a subset of data from D1, denoted as D¯1, is selected such that the prefer-
ences of all agents i in D¯1 are identical. It was determined that D¯1 = {(pit, xit) : i ∈
{1, 3, 5, 7, 12}}. Since the preferences of these bidders are identical, we can consider
all the data in D¯1 as originating from a single representative bidder. This allows an
improved estimate of the utility function of these bidders as compared to learning the
utility function for each bidder separately. An analogous explanation is used for the
construction of D¯2 = {(pit, xit) : i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}} from the dataset D2. The esti-
mated utility function for D¯1 is given in Fig.16(a) and for D¯2 in Fig.16(b). As seen
from Fig.16(a) and Fig.16(b), bidders have a preference to increase the number of bids
compared with increasing the mean bid amount or the difference in mean bid amount.
This follows logically as xit(2) increases, the bidder will have to pay more tokens to win
the question limiting their ability to bid in future auctions. Interestingly, the bidders
show strategic and frantic behaviour in both datasets D¯1 and D¯2, as seen in Fig.16(a)
and Fig.16(b). This is consistent with the results in [155] which show that bidders
change their bidding behavior between successive auctions.
The analysis shows that auctioneers should target bidders that show frantic bidding
behavior as they are likely to overspend on items increasing the revenue of the auc-
tioneer. Such behavior can be detected using utility maximization test and constructed
utility function from Afriat’s Theorem.
(a) Estimated utility function u(xt) using dataset
D¯1 defined in Sec.4.5.
(b) Estimated utility function u(xt) using dataset
D¯2 defined in Sec.4.5.
Figure 16: Estimated utility function of bidders is constructed using (52) using the
datasets D¯1 and D¯2 defined in Sec.4.5. The black dots represent the utility associated
with experimentally measured responses, and the colour (blue to red) indicates the
utility level. The black dots indicate the observed demands, and the shape (i.e. circle,
diamond etc.) denotes the respective bidder.
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4.6 Dataset 2: Ontario Electrical Energy Market Dataset
In this section we consider the aggregate power consumption of different zones in the
Ontario power grid. A sampling period of T = 79 days starting from January 2013 is
used to generate the dataset D for the analysis. All price and power consumption data
is available from the Independent Electricity System Operator23 (IESO) website. Each
zone is considered as an agent in the corporate network illustrated in Fig.15. The study
of corporate social networks was pioneered by Granovetter [73, 74] which shows that
the social structure of the network can have important economic outcomes. Examples
include agents choice of alliance partners, assumption of rational behavior, self interest
behavior, and the learning of other agents behavior. Here we test for rational behavior
(i.e. utility maximization and Nash rationality), and if true then learn the associated be-
havior of the zones. This analysis provides useful information for constructing demand
side management (DSM) strategies for controlling power consumption in the electric-
ity market. For example, if a utility function exists it can be used in the DSM strategy
presented in [50, 146].
The zones power consumption is regulated by the associated price of electricity set
by the senior management officer in each respective zone. Since there is a finite amount
of power in the grid, each officer must communicate with other officers in the network
to set the price of electricity. Here we utilize the aggregate power consumption from
each of the n = 10 zones in the Ontario power grid and apply the non-parametric tests
for utility maximization (51) and Nash rationality (56) to detect if the zones are de-
mand responsive. If the utility maximization or Nash rationality tests are satisfied, then
the power consumption behaviour is modelled by constructing the associated utility
function (52) or concave potential function of the game (57).
To perform the analysis the external influence pt and response of agents xt must be
defined. In the Ontario power grid the wholesale price of electricity is dependent on
several factors such as consumer behaviour, weather, and economic conditions. There-
fore the external influence is defined as pt = [pt(1), pt(2)] with pt(1) the average elec-
tricity price between midnight and noon, and pt(2) as the average between noon and
midnight with t denoting day. The response of each zone correspond to the total aggre-
gate power consumption in each respective tie associated with pt(1) and pt(2) and is
given by xit = [x
i
t(1), x
i
t(2)] with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The budget Iit of each zone has units
of dollars as pt has units of $/kWh and xit units of kWh.
We found that the aggregate consumption data of each zone does not satisfy Afriat’s
utility maximization test (51). This points to the possibility that the zones are engaged
in a concave potential game–this would not be a surprising result as network congestion
games have been shown to reduce peak power demand in distributed demand manage-
ment schemes [91]. To test if the dataset D is consistent with Nash rationality the
detection test (56) is applied. The dataset for the power consumption in the Ontario
power gird is consistent with Nash rationality. Using (59), a concave potential function
for the game is constructed. Using the constructed potential function, when do agents
prefer to consume power? The marginal rate of substitution24 (MRS) can be used to
23http://ieso-public.sharepoint.com/
24The amount of one good that an agent is willing to give up in exchange for another good while main-
taining the same level of utility.
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determine the preferred time for power usage. Formally, the MRS of xi(1) for xi(2) is
given by
MRS12 =
∂Vˆ/∂xi(1)
∂Vˆ/∂xi(2)
.
From the constructed potential function we find that MRS12 > 1 suggesting that the
agents prefer to use power in the time period associated with xt(1)–that is, the agents
are willing to give up MRS12 kWh of power in the time period associated with xi(2) for
1 additional kWh of power in time period associated with xi(1).
The analysis in this section suggests that the power consumption behavior of agents
is consistent with players engaged in a concave potential game. Using the Multiagent
Afriat’s Theorem the agents preference for using power was estimated. This informa-
tion can be used to improve the DSM strategies presented in [50, 146] to control power
consumption in the electricity market.
4.7 Dataset 3: Twitter Data
Does the tweeting behaviour of Twitter agents satisfy a utility maximization process?
The goal is to investigate how tweets and trend indices25 impact the tweets of agents
in the Twitter social network. The information provided by this analysis can be used
in social media marketing strategies to improve a brand and for brand awareness. As
discussed in [68], Twitter may relay on a huge amount of agent-generated data which
can be analyzed to provide novel personal advertising to agents.
To apply Afriat’s utility maximization test (51), we choose the external influence
and response as follows. External influence pt = [#Sony, 1/#Playstation] for each
day t. The associated response taken by the agents in the network is given by xt =
[#Microsoft, #Xbox]. Notice that the probe pt(2) can be interpreted as the frequency of
tweets with the word Playstation (i.e. the trending index). The dataset D of external
influence and responses is constructed from T = 80 days of Twitter data starting from
January 1st 2013. The datasetD satisfies the utility maximization test (51). This estab-
lishes that utility function exists for agents that is dependent on the number of tweets
containing the words Microsoft and Xbox. The data shows that tweets containing the
word Microsoft and Xbox are dependent on the number of tweets containing Sony and
trending index of Playstation. This dependency is expected as Microsoft produces the
game console Xbox, and Sony produces the game console Playstation both which have
a large number of brand followers (e.g. Xbox has over 3 million, and Playstation over
4 million). To gain further insight into the behaviour of the agents, (52) from Afriat’s
Theorem is used to construct a utility function for the agents. Fig.17 shows the con-
structed utility function of the agents. As seen, agents have a higher utility for using the
word Microsoft as compared to Xbox–that is, agents prefer to use the word Microsoft to
that of Xbox. Interestingly, if we define the response to be xt = [#Microsoft, 1/#Xbox],
then the dataset satisfies utility maximization. From the constructed utility function,
not shown, the agents prefer to increase the tweets containing the word Microsoft com-
pared to increasing the trend index of Xbox. If instead xt = [1/#Microsoft, 1/#Xbox],
25Here we define the trend index as the frequency of tweets containing a particular word [68].
54
then the dataset satisfies utility maximization and agents prefer to increase the trend
index of Microsoft compared to that of Xbox.
To summarize, the above analysis suggests the following interesting fact: Xbox
has a lower utility than Microsoft in terms of Twitter sentiment. Therefore, online
marketing strategies should target the brandname Microsoft instead of Xbox.
Figure 17: Estimated utility function u(xt) using datasetD defined in Sec.4.7 and con-
structed using the non-parametric learning algorithm (52) from Afriat’s Theorem.
4.8 Summary and Extensions
The principle of revealed preferences is an active research area with numerous recent
papers. We have already mentioned the papers [54, 175, 26]. Below we summarize
some related literature that extends the basic framework of Afriat’s theorem.
Afriat’s theorem holds for finite datasets and gives an explicit construction of a
class of concave utility functions that rationalize the dataset. Mas Colell [133] has
given sufficient conditions under which as the data set size T grows to infinity, the
underlying utility function of the consumer can be fully identified.
Though the classical Afriat’s theorem holds for linear budget constraints p′t x ≤ It
in (50), an identical formulation holds for certain non-linear budget constraints as illus-
trated in [61]. The budget constraints considered in [61] are of the form {x ∈ Rm+ |g(x) ≤
0} where g : Rm+ → R is an increasing continuous function and Rm+ denotes the positive
orthant. Also [61] shows how the results in [133] on recoverability of the utility func-
tion can be extended to such nonlinear budget constraints. However, learning the utility
function from a finite dataset in the case of a non-linear budget constraint requires so-
phisticated machine learning algorithms [115]. The machine learning algorithms can
only guarantee that the estimated utility function is approximately consistent with the
dataset D–that is, the estimated utility is not guaranteed to contain all the preference
relations consistent with the datasetD.
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In [20], results in statistical learning theory are applied to the principle of revealed
preferences to address the question: Is the class of demand functions derived from
monotone concave utilities efficiently probably approximately correct (PAC) learnable?
It is shown that Lipschitz utility functions are efficiently PAC learnable. In [89], the
authors extend the results of [20] and show that for agents engaged in a concave poten-
tial game that satisfy Nash rationality, if the underlying potential function satisfies the
Lipschitz condition then the potential function of the game is PAC learnable.
In many cases, the responses of agents are observed in noise. Then determining
if an agent is a utility maximizer (or a multiagent system’s response is consistent with
play from a Nash) becomes a statistical decision test. In [111] it is shown how stochas-
tic optimization algorithms can be devised to optimize the probe signals to minimize
the type II errors of the decision test subject to a fixed type I error.
Change Point Detection in Utility Functions
[13] extends the classical revealed preference framework to agents with a “dynamic
utility function”. The utility function jump changes at an unknown time instant by a
linear perturbation. Given the dataset of probe and responses of an agent, the objective
in [13] is to develop a nonparametric test to detect the change point and the utility
functions before and after the change, which is henceforth referred to as the change
point detection problem.
Such change point detection problems arise in online search in social media. On-
line search is currently the most popular method for information retrieval [166] and
can be viewed as an agent maximizing the information utility, i.e. the amount of infor-
mation consumed by an online agent given the limited resource on time and attention.
There has been a gamut of research which links internet search behaviour to ground
truths such as symptoms of illness, political election, or major sporting events [190].
Detection of utility change in online search, therefore, is helpful to identify changes in
ground truth. Also, the intrinsic nature of the online search utility function motivates
such a study under a revealed preference setting.
The problem of detecting a sudden linear perturbation change in the utility function
is motivated by several reasons. First, the linear perturbation assumption provides
sufficient selectivity such that the non-parametric test is not trivially satisfied by all
datasets but still provides enough degrees of freedom. Second, the linear perturbation
can be interpreted as the change in the marginal rate of utility relative to a “base”
utility function. In online social media, the linear perturbation coefficients measure the
impact of marketing or the measure of severity of the change in ground truth on the
utility of the agent. This is similar to the linear perturbation models used to model taste
changes [5, 134, 63] in microeconomics. Finally, in social networks, linear change
in the utility is often used to model the change in utility of an agent based on the
interaction with the agent’s neighbours [39]. Compared to the taste change model, our
model is unique in that we allow the linear perturbation to be introduced at an unknown
time.
A related important practical issue that we also consider in this paper is the ap-
plication of revealed preference framework to high dimensional data (“big-data”). As
an example of high dimensional data arising in online social media, we investigate the
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detection of the utility maximization process inherent in video sharing via YouTube.
Detecting utility maximization behaviour with such high dimensional data is computa-
tionally demanding. [13] uses dimensionality reduction to overcome the computational
cost associated with high dimensional data. The high dimensional data is projected into
a lower dimensional subspace using the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) transform.
5 Social Interaction of Channel Owners and YouTube
Consumers
In this section time-series analysis methods are applied to real-world YouTube data
to determine how social sensors interact with YouTube channel owners. Several key
results are presented that elucidate the dynamics of social sensors in the YouTube social
network. This section contains five main results.
1. Sec.5.2 illustrates the sensitivity of social sensor engagement to changes in meta-
level (title, thumbnail, tags) features of YouTube videos. It is found that meta-
level feature optimization causes an increase in user engagement for approxi-
mately 50% of videos. Optimization of the title of the video causes a significant
improvement of users finding the video from YouTube search results. Addi-
tionally, optimization of the thumbnail causes an increase in users accessing the
video from the related video list26.
2. In Sec.5.3 Granger causality is used to show that a causal relationship exists
between a channels subscriber count and the social sensor engagement of videos
on the channel. However, this causal relationship is dependent on the category.
For example, 80% of the “Entertainment” channels satisfy the Granger causality
test while only 40% of the “Food” channels satisfy the test.
3. In Sec.5.4 it is determined that for popular gaming YouTube channels with a
dominant (constant) upload schedule, deviating from the schedule increases the
views and the comment counts of the channel (e.g. increases user engagement).
Specifically, when the channel goes off schedule the channel gains views 97% of
the time and the channel gains comments 68% of the time.
4. In Sec.5.5 we illustrate that the social sensor engagement dynamics with YouTube
videos can be modeled using a generalized Gompertz model. The generalized
Gompertz model accounts for the initial viral increase in views from subscribers,
the subsequent linear growth that results from non-subscribers, and views from
exogenous events such as promotion on other popular social media platforms. It
is important to account for exogenous events when estimating the efficiency of
meta-level optimization procedures.
5. In Sec.5.6 the generalized Gombertz model is used to study the dynamics of so-
cial sensors to video playthroughs (squence of videos on the same topic). It is
illustrated that the early view count dynamics are highly correlated with the view
count dynamics of future videos. Both the short term view count and long term
26In YouTube, the suggested videos refers to the overall list to the right of the video player on the watch
page which is populated with suggestions for what to watch next. A subset of these suggested videos, known
as related videos, can also be displayed at the end of a YouTube video.
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migration of users to future videos in the playthrough decrease after the initial
video in the playthrough is posted. This results even when the channels sub-
scriber count increases. A possible reason for this decrease is that subsequent
videos in the playthrough become repetitive and hence decrease user engage-
ment.
The results in this section are based on the extensive BroadBandTV27 (BBTV)
dataset. Extrapolating these results to other YouTube datasets is an important problem
worth addressing by the reader. For example, an extension of this work could involve
studying the effect of video characteristics on different traffic sources, for example the
affect of tweets or posts of videos on Twitter or Facebook.
5.1 YouTube Dataset
All the results in this section are constructed using the extensive YouTube dataset
provided by BBTV28. The dataset contains daily samples of meta-level features of
YouTube videos and channels on the BBTV platform from April, 2007 to May, 2015,
and has a size of several terabytes. The meta-level features include: views, comments,
likes, dislikes, shares, and subscribers which are recorded each day since the video was
published. The dataset contains information for over 6 million videos spread over 25
thousand channels. Table 1 shows the statistics summary of the videos present in the
dataset.
Table 1: Dataset summary
Videos 6 million
Channels 26 thousand
Average number of videos (per channel) 250
Average age of videos 275 days
Average number of views (per video) 10 thousand
Table 2, shows the summary of the various category of the videos present in the
dataset. The dataset contains a large percentage of gaming videos. Fig. 18 shows the
Table 2: YouTube dataset categories (out of 6 million videos)
Category Fraction
Gaming 0.69
Entertainment 0.07
Food 0.07
Music 0.035
Sports 0.017
27BroadBandTV is one of the largest YouTube video partners in the world. http://bbtv.com/press/
broadbandtv-now-the-largest-multi-platform-network-worldwide
28http://bbtv.com/
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fraction of videos as a function of the age of the videos. There is a large fraction of
videos uploaded within a year. Also, the dataset captures the exponential growth in the
number of videos uploaded to YouTube. Similar to [156], we define three categories
 Age of videos 
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Figure 18: The fraction of videos in the dataset as a function of the age of the videos.
There is a significant percentage of newer videos (videos with less age) compared to
older videos. Hence, the dataset capture the exponential growth of the number of videos
uploaded to YouTube.
of videos based on their popularity: Highly popular, popular, and unpopular. Table 3
gives a summary of the fraction of videos in the dataset belonging to each category. As
can be seen from Table 3, the majority of the videos in the dataset belong to the popular
category.
Table 3: Popularity distribution of videos in the dataset
Criteria Fraction
Highly Popular (Total Views > 104) 0.12
Popular (150 < Total Views < 104) 0.67
Unpopular (Total Views < 150) 0.21
A unique feature of the dataset is that it contains information about the “meta-level optimization”
for videos. The meta-level optimization is a change in the title, tags or thumbnail, of
an existing video in order to increase the popularity. BBTV markets a product that
intelligently automates the meta-level optimization. Table 4 gives a summary of the
statistics of the various meta-level optimization present in the dataset.
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Table 4: Optimization summary statistics
Optimization # Videos
Title change 21 thousand
Thumbnail change 13 thousand
Keyword change 21 thousand
5.2 Social Sensor Engagement Sensitivity to Meta-Level Optimiza-
tion
Here we analyze how changing meta-level features, after a video is posted, impacts
the user engagement of the video. Meta-level data plays a significant role in the dis-
covery of content, through YouTube search, and in video recommendation, through
the YouTube related videos29. Hence, “optimizing” the meta-level data to enhance the
discoverability and user engagement of videos is of significant importance to content
providers. Therefore, in this section, we study how optimizing the title, thumbnail or
keywords affect the view count of YouTube videos.
To perform the sensitivity analysis we utilize the dataset presented in Sec.5.1, and
remove any time-sensitive videos. Time-sensitive videos are those videos that are rel-
evant for a short period of time and the popularity of such videos cannot be improved
by optimization. We removed the following two time-sensitive categories of videos:
“politics” and “movies and trailers”. In addition, we removed videos (from other cat-
egories) which contained the following keywords in their video meta-data: “holiday”,
“movie”, or “trailers”. For example, holiday videos are not watched frequently during
off-holiday times.
Let τˆi be the time at which the meta-level optimization was performed on video
i and let si, denote the corresponding sensitivity. We characterize the sensitivity to
meta-level optimization as follows:
si =
(∑τˆi+6
t=τˆi
vi(t)
)
/7(∑τˆi
t=τˆi−6 vi(t)
)
/7
(60)
The numerator of (60) is the mean value of the view count 7 days after optimization.
Similarly, the denominator of (60) is the mean value of the view count 7 days before
optimization. The results are provided in Table 5 for optimization of the title, thumb-
nail, and keywords.
As shown in Table 5, at least half of the optimizations resulted in an increase in
the popularity of the video. In addition, compared to videos with no optimization, the
meta-level optimization improves the probability of increased popularity by 45%. This
is consistent with YouTube and BBTV recommendation to optimize meta-level features
to increase user engagement. However, some class of videos benefit from optimizing
meta-data much more than others. The effect may be due to small user channels, which
29Related and suggested videos appear surrounding the current video being viewed by the user.
30“No change” was obtained by randomly selecting 104 videos which performed no optimization and
evaluating si 3 months from the date of posting the video.
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Optimization Fraction of Videos with increased popularity
Title change 0.52
Thumbnail change 0.533
Keyword change 0.50
No change30 0.35
Table 5: Sensitivity to Meta-Level Optimization. The table shows than in more than
50% the videos, meta-level optimization resulted in an increase in the popularity of the
video.
have limited number of videos and subscribers, gain by optimizing the meta-level data
of the video compared to hugely popular channels such as Sony or CNN. The highly
popular channel (e.g. Sony or CNN) upload videos frequently (even multiple times
daily), so video content becomes irrelevant quickly. The question of which class of
users gain by optimizing the meta level features of the video is part of our ongoing
research.
Table 6 summarizes the impact of various meta-level changes on the three major
sources of YouTube traffic, i.e. YouTube search31, YouTube promoted32 and traffic
from related videos33. For those videos where meta-level optimization increased the
popularity (the ratio of the mean value of the views after and before optimization is
higher than one), we computed the sensitivity for various traffic sources as in (60).
Table 6 summarizes the median statistics of the ratio of the traffic sources before and
after optimization. The title optimization resulted in significant improvement (approx-
Optimization Related Promoted Search
Title change 1.13 NAa 1.24
Thumbnail change 1.20 NAa 1.125
Keyword change 1.10 1.16 1
aNot enough data available: A binomial test to check for the true hypothesis with 95% confidence interval
requires that the sample size, n, should be at least
(
1.96
0.04
)2
p(1 − p). With p = 0.5, n > 600.
Table 6: Sensitivity of various traffic sources to meta-level optimization, for videos
with increased popularity. The title optimization resulted in significant improvement
(approximately 25%) from the YouTube search. Similarly, thumbnail optimization im-
proved traffic from the related videos and keyword optimization resulted in increased
traffic from related and promoted videos.
imately 25%) from the YouTube search. Similarly, thumbnail optimization improved
traffic from the related videos and keyword optimization resulted in increased traffic
31Video views that resulted users selecting the video from the YouTube search results.
32Video views that result from channels paying YouTube to increase their probability of being included at
the top of search result lists.
33Video views that resulted from users clicking on a thumbnail that was listed on the page of another video
they were viewing.
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from related and promoted videos.
Summary: This section studied the sensitivity of view count with respect to meta-level optimization.
The main finding is that meta-level optimization increased the popularity of video in
the majority of cases. In addition, we found that optimizing the title improved traf-
fic from YouTube search. Similarly, thumbnail optimization improved traffic from the
related videos and keyword optimization resulted in increased traffic from related and
promoted videos.
5.3 Causal Relationship Between Channel Subscribers and Social
Sensor Engagement
In this section the goal is to detect if a causal relationship exists between subscriber
and viewer counts and how it can be used to estimate the next day subscriber count of
a channel. The results are of interest for measuring the popularity of a YouTube chan-
nel. Fig. 19 displays the subscriber and view count dynamics of a popular movie trailer
channel in YouTube. It is clear from Fig. 19 that the subscribers “spike” with a corre-
sponding “spike” in the view count. In this section we model this causal relationship of
the subscribers and view count using the Granger causality test from the econometric
literature [71].
The main idea of Granger causality is that if the value(s) of a lagged time-series can
be used to predict another time-series, then the lagged time-series is said to “Granger
cause” the predicted time-series. To formalize the Granger causality model, let s j(t)
denote the number of subscribers to a channel j on day t, and v ji (t) the corresponding
view count for a video i on channel j on day t. The total number of videos in a channel
on day t is denoted by I(t). Define,
vˆ j(t) =
I(t)∑
i=1
v ji (t), (61)
as the total view count of channel j at time t. The Granger causality test involves
testing if the coefficients bi are non-zero in the following equation which models the
relationship between subscribers and view counts:
s j(t) =
ns∑
k=1
a jk s
j(t − k) +
nv∑
i=k
b jkvˆ
j(t − k) + ε j(t), (62)
where ε j(t) represents normal white noise for channel j at time t. The parameters
{a ji }{i=1,...,ns} and {b ji }{i=1,...,nv} are the coefficients of the AR model in (62) for channel j,
with ns and nv denoting the lags for the subscriber and view counts time series respec-
tively. If the time-series D j = {s j(t), vˆ j(t)}t∈{1,...,T } of a channel j fits the model (62),
then we can test for a causal relationship between subscribers and view count. In equa-
tion (62), it is assumed that |ai| < 1, |bi| < 1 for stationarity. The causal relationship
can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem as follows:
H0 : b1 = · · · = bnv = 0 vs. H1 : Atleast one bi , 0. (63)
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The rejection of the null hypothesis, H0, implies that there is a causal relationship
between subscriber and view counts.
First, we use Box-Ljung test [64] is to evaluate the quality of the model (62) for the
given dataset D j. If satisfied, then the Granger causality hypothesis (63) is evaluated
using the Wald test [182]. If both hypothesis tests pass then we can conclude that the
time seriesD j satisfies Granger causality–that is, the previous day subscriber and view
count have a causal relationship with the current subscriber count.
A key question prior to performing the Granger causality test is what percentage of
videos in the YouTube dataset (Appendix) satisfy the AR model in (62). To perform
this analysis we apply the Box-Ljung test with a confidence of 0.95 (p-value = 0.05).
First, we need to select ns and nv, the number of lags for the subscribers and view
count time series. For ns = nv = 1, we found that only 20% of the channels satisfy
the model (62). When ns and nv are increased to 2, the number of channels satisfying
the model increases to 63%. For ns = nv = 3, we found that 91% of the channels
satisfy the model (62), with a confidence of 0.95 (p-value = 0.05). Hence, in the below
analysis we select ns = nv = 3. It is intersting to note that the mean value of coefficients
bi decrease as i increases indicating that older view counts have less influence on the
subscriber count. Similar results also hold for the coefficients ai. Hence, as expected,
the previous day subscriber count and the previous day view count most influence the
current subscriber count.
The next key question is does their exist a causal relationship between the sub-
scriber dynamics and the view count dynamics. This is modeled using the hypothe-
sis in (63). To test (63) we use the Wald test with a confidence of 0.95 (p-value =
0.05) and found that approximately 55% of the channels satisfy the hypothesis. For
approximately 55% of the channels that satisfy the AR model (62), the view count
“Granger causes” the current subscriber count. Interestingly, if different channel cate-
gories are accounted for then the percentage of channels that satisfy Granger causality
vary widely as illustrated in Table 7. For example, 80% of the Entertainment chan-
nels satisfy Granger causality while only 40% of the Food channels satisfy Granger
causality. These results illustrate the importance of channel owners to not only maxi-
mize their subscriber count, but to also upload new videos or increase the views of old
videos to increase their channels popularity (i.e. via increasing their subscriber count).
Additionally, from our analysis which illustrates that the view count of a posted video
is sensitive to the number of subscribers of the channel, increasing the number of sub-
scribers will also increase the view count of videos that are uploaded by the channel
owners.
5.4 Video Upload Scheduling and Social Sensor Engagement
Here we investigate how the video upload scheduling dynamics of YouTube channels
impacts social sensor engagement. We find the interesting property that for popular
gaming YouTube channels with a dominant (constant) upload schedule, deviating from
the schedule increases the views and the comment counts of the channel (e.g. increases
user engagement).
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Categorya Fraction
Gaming 0.60
Entertainment 0.80
Food 0.40
Sports 0.67
aYouTube assigns a category to videos, rather than channels. The category of the channel was obtained
as the majority of the category of all the videos uploaded by the channel.
Table 7: Fraction of channels satisfying the hypothesis: View count “Granger causes”
subscriber count, split according to category.
Creator Academy34 in their best practice section recommends to upload videos on
a regular schedule to get repeat views. The reason for a regular upload schedule is to
increase the user engagement and to rank higher in the YouTube recommendation list.
However, we show in this section that going “off the schedule” can be beneficial for a
gaming YouTube channel, with a regular upload schedule, in terms of the number of
views and the number of comments.
From the dataset, we “filtered out” video channels with a dominant upload sched-
ules, as follows: The dominant upload schedule was identified by taking the peri-
odogram of the upload times of the channel and then comparing the highest value to the
next highest value. If the ratio defined above is greater than 2, we say that the channel
has a dominant upload schedule. From the dataset containing 25 thousand channels,
only 6500 channels contain a dominant upload schedule. Some channels, particularly
those that contain high amounts of copied videos such as trailers, movie/TV snippets
upload videos on a daily basis. These have been removed from the above analysis. The
expectation is that by doing so we concentrate on those channels that contain only user
generated content.
We found that channels with gaming content account for 75% of the 6500 channels
with a dominant upload schedule35 and the main tags associated with the videos were:
“game”, “gameplay” and “videogame”36. We computed the average views when the
channel goes off the schedule and found that on an average when the channel goes off
schedule the channel gains views 97% of the time and the channel gains comments
68% of the time. This suggests that channels with “gameplay” content have periodic
upload schedule and benefit from going off the schedule.
5.5 Social Sensor Engagement Dynamics with YouTube Videos
Several time-series analysis methods have been employed in the literature to model
the view count dynamics of YouTube videos. These include ARMA time series mod-
els [75], multivariate linear regression models [153], hidden Markov models [95],
normal distribution fitting [60], and parametric model fitting [156, 157]. Though all
34YouTube website for helping with channels
35This could also be due to the fact gaming videos account for 70% of the videos in the dataset.
36We used a topic model to obtain the main tags.
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Figure 19: Viewcount and subscribers for the popular movie trailer channel: VISO-
Trailers. The Granger causality test for view counts “Granger causes” subscriber count
is true with a p-value of 5 × 10−8.
these models provide an estimate of the view count dynamics of videos, we are inter-
ested in segmenting view count dynamics of a video resulting from subscribers, non-
subscribers and exogenous events. Exogenous events are due to video promotion on
other social networking platform such as Facebook or the video being referenced by
a popular news organization or celebrity on Twitter. Detecting and accounting for ex-
ogenous events is motivated by the need for extracting accurate view counts resulting
from exogenous events that provide an estimate of the efficiency of video promotion
methods and meta-level feature optimizations.
The view count dynamics of popular videos in YouTube typically show an initial vi-
ral behaviour, due to subscribers watching the content, and then a linear growth result-
ing from non-subscribers. The linear growth is due to new users migrating from other
channels or due to interested users discovering the content either through search or rec-
ommendations (we call this phenomenon migration similar to [156]). Hence, without
exogenous events, the view count dynamics of a video due to subscribers and non-
subscribers can be estimated using piecewise linear and non-linear segments. In [156],
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it is shown that a Gompertz time series model can be modeled the view count dynamics
from subscribers and non-subscribers, if no exogenous events are present. In this chap-
ter, we generalize the model in [156] to account for views from exogenous events. It
should be noted that classical change-point detection methods [170] cannot be used
here as the underlying distribution generating the view count is unknown.
To account for the view count dynamics introduced from exogenous events we use
the generalized Gompertz model given by:
v¯i(t) =
Kmax∑
k=0
wki (t)u(t − tk),
wki (t) = Mk
(
1 − e−ηk
(
ebk(t−tk)−1
))
+ ck(t − tk),
(64)
where v¯i(t) is the total view count for video i at time t, u(·) is the unit step function, t0
is the time the video was uploaded, tk with k ∈ {1, . . . ,Kmax} are the times associated
with the Kmax exogenous events, and wki (t) are Gompertz models which account for
the view count dynamics from uploading the video and from the exogenous events. In
total there are Kmax + 1 Gompertz models with each having parameters tk,Mk, ηk, bk.
Mk is the maximum number of requests not including migration for an exogenous event
at tk, ηk and bk model the initial growth dynamics from event tk, and ck accounts for
the migration of other users to the video. In (64) the parameters {Mk, ηk, bk}k=0 are
associated with the subscriber views when the video is initially posted, the parameters
{tk,Mk, ηk, bk}Kmaxk=1 are associated with views introduced from exogenous events, and
the views introduced from migration are given by {ck}Kmaxk=0 . Each Gompertz model (64)
captures the initial viral growth when the video is initially available to users, followed
by a linearly increasing growth resulting from user migration to the video.
The parameters θi = {ak, tk,Mk, ηk, bk, ck}Kmaxk=0 in (64) can be estimated by solving
the following mixed-integer non-linear program:
θi ∈ arg min
{ Ti∑
t=0
(
v¯i(t) − vi(t))2 + λK}
K =
Kmax∑
k=0
ak, ak ∈ {0, 1} k ∈ {0, . . . ,Kmax}, (65)
with Ti the time index of the last recorded views of video vi, and ak a binary variable
equal to 1 if an exogenous event is present at tk. Note that (65) is a difficult optimization
problem as the objective is non-convex as a result of the binary variables ak [33]. In
the YouTube social network when an exogenous event occurs this causes a large and
sudden increase in the number of views, however as seen in Fig. 20, a few days after
the exogenous event occurs the views only result from migration (i.e. linear increase
in total views). Assuming that each exogenous event is followed by a linear increase
in views we can estimate the total number of exogenous events Kmax present in a given
time-series by first using a segmented linear regression method, and then counting the
number of segments of connected linear segments with a slope less then cmax. The
parameter cmax is the maximum slope for the views to be considered to result from
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viewer migration. Plugging Kmax into (65) results in the optimization of a non-linear
program for the unknowns {tk,Mk, ηk, bk, ck}Kmaxk=0 . This optimization problem can be
solved using sequential quadratic programming techniques [23].
To illustrate how the Gompertz model (64) can be used to detect for exogenous
events, we apply (64) to the view count dynamics of a video that only contains a single
exogenous event. Fig. 20 displays the total view count of a video where an exogenous
event occurs at time t = 41 (i.e. t1 = 41 in (64)) days after the video is posted37. The
initial increase in views for the video for t ≤ 7 days results from the 2910 subscribers of
the channel viewing the video. For 7 ≤ t ≤ 41, other users that are not subscribed to the
channel migrate to view the video at an approximately constant rate of 13 views/day.
At t = 41, an exogenous event occurs causing an increase in the views per day. The dif-
ference in viewers, resulting from the exogenous event, is 7174. For t ≥ 43, the views
result primarily from the migration of users to approximately 2 views/day. Hence,
using the generalized Gompertz model (64) we can differentiate between subscriber
views, views caused by exogenous events, and views caused by migration.
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Figure 20: Due to an exogenous event on day 41, there is a sudden increase in the
number of views. The total view count fitted by the Gompertz model v¯i(t) in (64) is
shown in black with the virality (exponential) and migration (linear) illustrated by the
dotted red.
5.6 Social Sensor Engagement for Channel Playthroughs
One of the most popular sequences of YouTube videos is the video game “playthrough”.
A video game playthrough is a set of videos for which each video has a relaxed and
casual focus on the game that is being played and typically contains commentary
from the user presenting the playthrough. Unlike YouTube channels such as CNN,
BBC, and CBC in which each new video can be considered independent from the
others, in a video playthrough the future view count of videos are influenced by the
previously posted videos in the playthrough. To illustrate this effect we consider a
37Due to privacy reasons, we cannot detail the specific event. Some of the reasons for the sudden increase
in the popularity of the video include: Another user on YouTube mentioning the video, this will encourage
viewers from that channel to view the video, resulting in a sudden increase in the number of views. Another
possibility is that the channel owner or a YouTube Partner like BBTV did significant promotional initiatives
on other social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, etc. to promote the channel or video.
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video playthrough for the game “BioShock Infinite”–a popular video game released
in 2013. The channel, popular for hosting such video playthroughs, contains close
to 4500 videos and 180 video playthroughs. The channel is highly popular and has
garnered a combined view count close to 100 million views with 150 thousand sub-
scribers over a period of 3 years. Fig. 21 illustrates that the early view count dynamics
are highly correlated with the view count dynamics of future videos. Both the short
term view count and long term migration of future videos in the playthrough decrease
after the initial video in the playthrough is posted. This results for two reasons, either
the viewers purchase the game, or the viewers leave as the subsequent playthroughs
become repetitive as a result of game quality or video commentary quality. A unique
effect with video playthroughs is that although the number of subscribers to the channel
hosting the videos in Fig. 21 increases over the 600 day period, the linear migration is
still maintained after the initial 50 days after the playthrough is published. Addition-
ally, the slope of the migration is related to the early total view count as illustrated in
Fig. 21(b).
5.7 Summary and Extensions
The application of time-series analysis and machine learning methods to gain insight
into the social sensor dynamics on YouTube is an active area of research with several
promising outcomes. First, they can be used to reduce the operating cost of content
distribution networks. In [88] a two time-scale game-theoretic learning algorithm is
constructed to optimally cache videos in the future 5G mobile network based on the
dynamics of the social sensors. In [164] the optimal caching decision is formulated
as a mixed-integer linear program that accounts for the dynamics of the social sen-
sors. Second, knowledge of the user dynamics can be used to optimize the meta-level
features of videos to maximize user engagement as illustrated in this section.
Significant work remains on the analysis of user dynamics in the YouTube social
network. Recall that in the YouTube social network interaction between users and
channel owners include:
1. Commenting on users videos. Commenting is YouTube’s version of engagement,
and it has some of the most involved, engaged and dedicated users. Addition-
ally, users can comment on other users comments which is very similar to users
interaction on blog posting sites except related to the uploaded videos.
2. Subscribing to YouTube channels provides a method of forming relationships
between users.
3. Users can directly comment on a YouTube channel without the need to only
interact when a video is posted.
4. Users can also interact by embedding videos from another users channel directly
into their own channel to promote exposure or form communities of users.
In addition to the social incentives, YouTube provides monetary incentives to promote
users increasing their popularity and engagement. As more users view and interact
with a users video or channel, YouTube will pay the user proportional to the adver-
tisement exposure on the users channel. Therefore, users not only maximize exposure
to increase their social popularity, but also for monetary gain which introduces unique
dynamics in the formation of edges in the YouTube social network. Using the dataset
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(a) Actual and predicted view count of playthrough. We
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Figure 21: Actual and predicted view count of a playthrough containing 25 YouTube
videos for the game “BioShock Infinite”. The predictions are computed by fitting
a modified Gompertz model (64) to the measured view count for each video in the
playthrough.
discussed in Sec.5.1, Fig.22 plots the communication network where an edge indicates
comments and responses between users that have interacted at least 1000 times. From
Fig.22(a), initially there appears to be two clusters of users that have strong interac-
tions indicating that user preferences play a significant role in forming the edges in
these clusters. After a period of 3 months, Fig.22(b) illustrates that more users have
entered the network however there still appears to be two primary clusters of interacting
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users. At 6 months, Fig.22(c) shows a dense interaction between several users in the
social network. The dynamics of these interaction links are governed by both the users
preferences and the video content that is uploaded by the users. Prior to edge forma-
tion, these clustered communities can detected by applying the homophilic community
detection tests introduced in [66]. These tests are designed to cluster users based on
their content preferences.
The dynamics of edge formation/destruction and user popularity in the social net-
work (illustrated in Fig.22) are governed by the user-user interaction and the user-
content-user interaction. Two key question to address in the YouTube social network
is: How do the social dynamics (subscribing, commenting, video content quality, video
category, etc.) impact the popularity of videos and the dynamics of the communication
network between users? Answers to this question provides valuable insight into the
evolving dynamics of the social network illustrated in Fig.22.
6 Closing Remarks
This chapter has discussed four important and inter-related themes regarding the dy-
namics of social sensors, namely, diffusion models for information in social networks,
Bayesian social learning, revealed preferences and how social sensors interact over
YouTube channels. In each case, examples involving real datasets were given to illus-
trate the various concepts. The unifying theme behind these three topics stems from
predicting global behavior given local behavior: individual social sensors make deci-
sions and learn from other social sensors and we are interested in understanding the
behavior of the entire network. In Sec.2 we showed that the global degree of infected
nodes can be determined by mean field dynamics. In Sec.3, it was shown that despite
the apparent simplicity in information flows between social sensors, the global system
can exhibit unusual behavior such as herding and data incest. Finally, in Sec.4 a non-
parametric method was used to determine the utility functions of a multiagent system -
this can be used to predict the response of the system.
This chapter has dealt with social sensing issues of relevance to a signal processing
audience. There are several topics of relevance to social sensors that are omitted due to
space constraints, including:
• Coordination of decisions via game-theoretic learning [79, 80, 141] or Bayesian
game models such as global games [12]
• Consensus formation over social networks and cooperative models of network
formation [103, 169]
• Controlled information fusion in social learning [24].
• Small world models [183, 100]
• Peer to peer media sharing [76, 189]
• Privacy and security modelling [116, 126]
• Influence Maximization; see [142] are references therein.
• Polling using friendship paradox; see [143] are references therein.
• The mobile edge cloud and popularity prediction for YouTube [90].
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(a) Initial: 239 users, 3,112 edges. (b) After 3 months: 503 users, 8,558 edges.
(c) After 6 months: 1,391 users, 31,701 edges.
Figure 22: Snapshots of the YouTube social network at 0 months, 3 months, and 6
months constructed using the dataset discussed in Sec.5.1. Node sizes and color indi-
cate their degree (red is higher, blue is lower). The complete social network is com-
posed of over 1.13 million users, and contains over 2.98 million edges. Only users with
at least 1000 edges are displayed.
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